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CONDITIONS OF PERSONAL SATISFACTION IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS
JAMES BROOK*

Entering into a contract is engaging in the art of compromise. The
end product represents not only a compromise between the needs and
desires of the various parties, but for each of the parties it is in effect a
compromise that he has entered into with himself. As long as the contract remains executory, as long as one promise which affects him either as promisor or promisee is yet to be performed, each party has
been able to achieve a measure of assurance about what he must do or
what he is to receive at some date in the future. What he cannot be
assured of is that when the time comes for performance he will feel as
positive about the then current state of affairs as he had thought,
hoped or merely assumed he would have at the time of contracting. He
may not have positive thoughts at all. In the interim his needs may
have changed (he may no longer need a house in a new town) or his
own ability to perform may have changed (he can no longer afford such
a house). It simply may be that his tastes have undergone a transformation, subtle or otherwise (Spanish Modem, once his favorite architectural style, is now abhorrent to him).
Of course a carefully drawn contract may help to minimize these
possibilities, but the basic problem is always there. While gaining the
security of future performance under contract, we compromise our futures. By its very nature, the executory contract relationship leaves
open the possibility that the future we have contracted for and bound
ourselves to will be a disappointment. The process of contracting can
bring about a more certain future, but it cannot leave us confident that
we will be satisfied with the future once we get there.! Our happiness
cannot be unalloyed. Our law of contracts can do so much; it can do no
more.
A contract for the future enhances certainty and security which
necessarily carries with it a restriction on unfettered choice and freedom. This would seem an inherent characteristic of contract law, indeed it is that which separates it from the barter process. From a very
early time, however, man has attempted to have things both ways by
*Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.A. 1968, Harvard University;
J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School.
1. It would be more accurate, of course, to acknowledge that the "certainty" each
party gains is not that what is promised in the contract will actually come to pass, but
only that either it will come to pass or the parties will find themselves in a new legal
relationship which after much wrangling may result in a court ordered remedy against
one party in favor of the other.
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creating a more certain future through the means of contract while allowing at least one party to retain independent choice in the future,
unrestricted by binding obligation.2 In particular, agreements may be
written to allow one party's performance to be conditioned upon his
"satisfaction" with some thing or state of affairs in the future. 3 While
such contracts usually involve one party's obligation to accept and pay
for another's performance in the future only if he is then "satisfied"
with it, an agreement may be drafted to provide that an obligation will
arise only if a person is "satisfied" with some event or condition totally
beyond the control of the other contracting party. For example, a contract for the purchase and sale of land can provide that the purchaser
is to take the land only if he can acquire "satisfactory financing" or if
he is able to obtain a zoning variance "satisfactory to him.'"
2. Professor Patterson has traced the history of such contracts and the law applied to
them back to ancient Rome and a contract for the sale of a slave, "if he has kept his
master's accounts satisfactorily." Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisors' Options
(pt. 1), 6 IOWA L. BULL. 129, 142-43 (1921), reprinted in AALS, SELECTED READINGS IN THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 401, 409-10 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Patterson].
3. Considering the variety of words that are similar to or synonymous with the word
"satisfaction," it is remarkable how often that particular word is chosen for the contract.
Parties may, of course, choose another term, but the courts usually reduce the question
to that of satisfaction. See, e.g., Fulcher v. Nelson, 273 N.C. 221, 159 S.E.2d 519 (1968)
(holding that satisfaction is synonym for happiness). In the field of the sale of goods the
question may arise in the context of a "sale on approval" or "sale or return." U.C.C. § 2326, Comment 1.
4. The possibility that a promise may be conditioned on something other than the
other party's performance was overlooked by the original Restatement of Contracts
which spoke only of "the promisor's satisfaction with an agreed exchange." RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement Second
ch~ges this to the satisfaction of the obligor "with respect to the obligee's performance
or with respect to something else," and comments that, "[u]sually it is the obligee's performance as to which the obligor is to be satisfied, but it may also be something else,
such as the propitiousness of circumstances for his enterprise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 228, Comment a(1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]
While this article, following convention, will speak in terms of conditions of personal
satisfaction, it must be recognized that contracts often contain language reading as a
promise to satisfy. On the particular question with which we are primarily concerned, the
test to be applied to claims of dissatisfaction, most courts apparently find the distinction
to be of nosignificance and treat the problem as one of conditions. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 675A, at 203 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]. Other writers on
the subject also treat the problem as one properly within the law of conditions. Only
Corbin makes any real effort to distinguish the promise from the condition, 3A A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 645 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN], though by so doing he
does not appear to add anything of significance.
A few cases do contain hints that the promise to satisfy and the condition of satisfaction may be viewed differently, though they are not in agreement as to what exactly
the difference should be. Compare Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 A.D.2d
447,200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1960) (fulfillment of condition is to be judged by subjective test; dictum that objective test may be appropriate for breach of promise) with

1981]

CONTRACTS

105

Since such an agreement seems at first glance an attempt to take
advantage of the classic contract mechanisms unhindered by limitations inherent in the system, it is not surprising that the common law
initially found it open to question whether the result could rise to the
level of "contract" at all.a This question, addressed in the following
section, is one which retains today what might be graciously called historicalsignificance.6 For even as at one time the theoreticians of contract law may have wrestled with the concepts of "mutuality" and
"consideration" as applied to such arrangements, one thing has long
been clear. Responsible seemingly intelligent people have had no difficulty accepting such an agreement as one which may be perfectly appropriate or even desirable in a given situation, and deserving of enforcement. What remains today is the more troublesome question of
exactly what it means to state that such agreements are enforced.
What precisely is the effect to be given them by the courts? This article examines the rules which have evolved by which the courts interpret or construe such conditions. In particular, it will consider the development of the so-called "objective" test which courts have
increasingly injected into the contract relationship and the implications of that decision.
1. THE PROBLEM OF "MUTUALITY"
Our first concern about contracts conditioned on personal satisfaction is whether they are contracts at all. Has either of the parties entering into such an agreement become legally bound to do anything?
The problem is the traditional one of mutuality of obligation. It is customary at this point to note the classic statement, said to be the most
fundamental of contract precepts, that "in bilateral contracts both parties must be bound or neither is bound.''7 It follows from this principle
that if the conditional promisor, by his agreement to perform only if
satisfied, has in effect not bound himself to do anything which he otherwise would not do, then he cannot have bound the other party to do
anything, and the agreement becomes a legal nullity. Rather, it has
been from the start a nullity and never has risen to the status of an
enforceable contract. Expressed in still another way, has the condi-

m.

Corbetta Constr. Co. v. Lake City Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 64
App. 3d 313, 381 N.E.2d
758 (1978) (while condition might demand an objective test, purchasers, when suing for
damages for breach, were entitled to more than that which might be considered some
form of reasonable construction).
5. See note 9 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 7-47 infra.
7. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLo, CONTRACTS §§ 4-14 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO]; J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 90 (2d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
MURRAY]. It should be noted that both authorities criticize the term "mutuality of obligation" along with its classic expression and call for abandonment of its use.
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tional promisor in this situation given valuable consideration so as to
make the other party's promise enforceable?8
Some early American cases expressed skepticism as to whether a
promise, conditional upon personal satisfaction, could ever constitute
valid consideration.9 Presumably this attitude was to a great extent
due to the then predominant influence of the so-called subjective theory of contract law and its fascination with the metaphoric "meeting of
the minds" of the parties forming the contract. With this as a background it would understandably be difficult to conceptualize either
party being bound and under obligation when one of the parties seems
so clearly to have not yet made up his mind at all. By the early part of
this century, any doubts regarding the enforceability of such agreements seem to have vanished from the cases,l° although the exact reason why such a promise could be valid consideration still stirred academic debate as the major theoreticians of the period confronted the
problem in the context of the various formulations espoused by the
emerging objectivist school of contracts.l1
In the rare cases that even acknowledge the problem today, it is
usually dealt with in a perfunctory manner.12 Modern treatises find little reason for a discussion beyond the simple assertion that such agreements are enforceable.l~ The explanation usually given is based on the
fact that in such cases courts will insist upon the promisor's exercising
honest judgment in good faith in determining whether or not he has
8. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, §§ 4-17; MURRAY, supra note 7, § 76. Fortunately, there seems to be no reason for us to pursue the controversy whether the two
ways of characterizing this issue are equivalent.
9. Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, 50 (1878); Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns 395, 402·03
(N.Y. 1807); 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 675, at 197 n.18.
10. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Colthurst, 78 Kan. 455, 456·57, 96 P. 851, 851 (1908);
Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Or. 30, 45, 76 P. 946, 949 (1904).
11. See Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571, 583 (1925);
Patterson, supra note 2 at 133-38.
12. See, e.g., Loma Linda Univ. v. District-Realty Title Ins. Co., 443 F.2d 773, 777
(D.C. Cir. 1971); American Oil Co. v. Carey, 246 F. Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Mich. 1965);
Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 122-23, 330 P.2d 625, 626-28 (1958); Boston Road
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 13 A.D.2d 106, 108·09, 213
N.Y.S.2d 522, 525·26 (1st Dep't 1961); Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. ll, 16-19,
200 S.E.2d 410, 414·16 (1973).
The only jurisdiction which still has much trouble on the point is Georgia, and there
confusion reigns. Compare, e.g., Hatfield v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 146 Ga. App.
642, 247 S.E.2d 161 (1978) (contracts requiring that one party's performance be satisfactory in the exercise of an honest judgment have been almost universally upheld as not
lacking in mutuality) with Stone Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmer, 139 Ga. App. 865,
229 S.E.2d 779 (1976) (contracts conditioned on "discretionary contingencies" lack
mutuality).
13. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 4, § 150; MURRAY, supra note 7, § 76; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment a; 1 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 44.
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been satisfied. 14 Thus, the promise to perform if satisfied is seen as
distinct from the classic nonpromise of "I'll pay if 1 wish to do so when
the time comes."15 The conditional promisor has retained control over
his future, but not unlimited control. He has fulfilled the theoretician's
requirement that he undergo a legal detriment by giving up the freedom to refuse to perform in the future for some reason other than his
dissatisfaction with the designated event or performance.1s Whether or
not his theoretical detriment is a real one depends, of course, on the
extent to which the requirement of good faith and honest judgment
can be and is enforced against the promisor. If it amounts to no more
than the requirement that the promisor at one point mouth the words,
"1 don't like it," then the real value of his conditional promise as valid
consideration could legitimately be questioned.17 The application of
the honesty test will be discussed in detail below,!8 but the conclusion
can be noted here that the test appears to be as practical and realistic
a test as any other calling for a determination of an individual's state
of mind. The significant number of cases in which the promisor has
been found to be lacking in the requisite good faith or honest demeanor suggests that the test can and does have in practice a real limiting effect on the promisor's behavior.
A different way of viewing the problem of mutuality and enforceable promises leads to the same result. A promise, as distinguished from
the poorly named "illusory promise" which is not a promise at all,lll
rather than being defined in terms of its effect on the promisor's future
freedom of activity, can be described by the effect it has on the one to
whom the promise is given.20 Writing in 1921, Professor Patterson
stated:
From an objective point of view, the characteristic of a promise
is that it arouses expectation in the promisee. Is the buyer's
14. See note 26 infra.
15. 1 CORBIN, supra note 4, § 150, at 667.
16. For a discussion of "mutuality" put in terms of the limits placed on the promisor's future freedom of action, see MURRAY, supra note 7, § 76.
17. Such a promise might be illusory, and as such could not constitute valid consideration. See CALAMARI & PERn.LO, supra note 7, §§ 11-18. An illusory promise has been
defined as "an expression cloaked in promissory terms, but which, upon closer examination, reveals that the promisor has committed himself not at all." ld. §§ 4-17. Corbin has
noted that "[i]f what appears to be a promise is an illusion, there is no promise, like the
mirage of the desert with its vision of flowing water which yet lets the traveller die of
thirst, there is nothing there." 1 CORBIN, supra note 4, § 145 at 627.
18. See notes 48-63 and accompanying text infra.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 2, Comment e. See also note 17 supra.
20. This is the type of definition given to the word "promise" by the Restatement
Second. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 2(1).
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promise in a "sale on approval" reasonably calculated to arouse
expectation in the promisee? The answer is to be sought, not
deductively, but empirically. In this view of the matter, the answer is given in no uncertain terms. The fact that contracts for
"sale on "approval" have been made and judicially enforced
from the time of Justinian, if not earlier, down to the present
day, is sufficient evidence that the expectations aroused by
such promises are so weighty that they cannot be ignored in
any legal ordering of society.21

In the ensuing years the situation has not changed. The uninitiated
observer might first question the wisdom of forming what purports to
be a binding agreement but which is to stand or fall on the future satisfaction of one of the parties. Yet such terms are not uncommon, nor
apparently thought of as particularly risky or daring, even in agreements involving large sums of money and major enterprises. These
terms appear in documents which have every appearance of being
drafted with care and the counsel of attorneys, a group normally adverse to risk and innovation, and obviously give rise to genuine expectations in the parties involved.22 There can be no doubt that courts will
look approvingly on such agreements and give them the effect of enforceable contracts.23 The nature of the contract that the parties have
made for themselves, and how the courts will enforce the arrangements, is a much more difficult question, and one to which we must
now turn our attention.
II. AN INTRODUCTION To THE Two TESTS
Even as it has become increasingly safe to say that an agreement
conditioned upon the personal satisfaction of one of the parties does
indeed bind them legally,24 it has become less certain what exactly they
have bound themselves to do. Under what circumstances will the
party's statement of dissatisfaction have the effect of serving as a failure of the condition, thus relieving him of his obligation? His statement of dissatisfaction in and of itself will not be sufficient to free him
of his duties. 25 Minimally, the statement, and the process of decision
21. Patterson, supra note 2, at 137. While Patterson refers to "sales on approval," it
is clear that he is considering contracts conditioned upon personal satisfaction generally.

Id.
22. A separate question that has been addressed by Patterson and later Corbin is the
extent to which the presence of language of "satisfaction" will influence a determination
of whether or not negotiations in a particular case have advanced to the point of contract. Id. at 138-42; 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 644, at 79-80.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, §§ 11-18.
25. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment a.
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which preceded it, must be made honestly and in good faith. 26 This
requirement is now generally recognized as the very reason such agreements become binding at all. 27 But is honest judgment and good faith
enough? The answer today is simply put: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It is generally recognized that in any given case the trier of
fact may be required to apply one of two tests in determining whether
legal effect should be given to the conditional promisor's decision that
he is dissatisfied with the performance or other state of affairs he is to
judge.
(1) The subjective test - Was his decision of dissatisfaction made
honestly and in good faith?
(2) The objective test - Was his decision made reasonably: That is,
would a reasonable person have been dissatisfied with the performance or other state of affairS?26
The distinction between these tests and the appropriate method
for choosing between them is the fundamental problem that confronts
the courts today with respect to contracts conditioned upon personal
26. In re Estate of Hollingsworth, 88 Wash. 2d 322, 328, 560 P.2d 348, 351 (1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment a.
27. The good faith requirement is an essential element in classifying the promise as
nonillusory. This classification allows the promise to constitute consideration. See note
17 supra.
28. This test is generally referred to as an "objective" test, and we will bow to the
usage though the message it conveys is probably misleading. We think of objective tests
or criteria as being measurable in concrete terms, independent of personal judgment and
evaluation. The type of test we are dealing with here merely replaces the fact finder's
individual judgment of one party's state of mind with his judgment of an even more
vague (arguably meaningless) concept. The factfinder's determination under-the test may
ultimately rest on hard facts and figures, but there is certainly no requirement that it do
so.
It appears that the notion of "objective" tests so described, and the "reasonable
person" himself, first worked their way into contract vocabulary to settle questions
which arise when parties misunderstand or misinterpret each other's "true" intention.
Emphasis is to be placed not on the subjective intention of the party making a manifestation but on the effect it had on the "reasonable" viewer or listener. No doubt encouraged by the very language chosen (who would want to defend "unreasonable" behavior?), the idea spread to questions in the law of contracts quite distinct from these initial
concerns about faulty communication. See generally Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153
F.2d 757, 760-65 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, C.J., concurring); 1 CORBIN, supra note 4, §§ 105106.
Of course, even the most carefully stated objective criterion, used in the most narrow sense, resolves itself into a matter of individual subjective judgment. You ask me to
obtain for you a piece of pipe "three feet long." If your need is only to prop up a window,
a piece of pipe within a few inches of the theoretical ideal of "three feet" will probably
do. One only a few millimeters off, however, would not meet the criterion if it is to be fit
into the highly precise workings of a spacecraft, for example. With any "exact" measure
the limit of tolerance which can be permitted is a matter of individual need and, if you
will, taste.
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satisfaction. Before becoming too deeply involved with the history and
details of each test, it seems wise to discuss precisely what each test
involves and what each purports to do. Discussion of this topic is so
often overwhelmed and rendered of questionable value by carelessness
and uncertainties of language/~9 that the actual nature of the decision
can easily be overlooked. Too often, decisions seem simply to be in
terms of whether or not the court will countenance the promisor's being "unreasonable" in the situation, whatever that word may be
thought to mean. It will not surprise anyone that such vague words
may only mask the true nature of the question actually before the
court.
There is significant difference between these two tests and it is not
merely the degree of latitude given to the conditional promisor in making his judgment.3o They differ in the very nature of the question of
fact which the trier must confront. To judge the honesty and good
faith with which a decision is made is to inquire into the process of
decision making. Strictly speaking, it does not concern itself with the
decision that results from that process. Though in individual cases the
conclusion reached may be taken into account in determining whether
the decision-making process was characterized by the appropriate behavior on the part of the promisor,81 it is only evidence to be weighed
in determining the ultimate issue of fact. 3t The objective test avoids
this inquiry into the party's state of mind. In fact it avoids all inquiry
into how the decision was made, or at least it purports to do SO.88 As
29. Two words that are often used by the courts and authors which seem to leave us
. in doubt are "arbitrary" and "capricious." Is either or both to be used as signifying a
decision made in bad faith or rather a decision made unreasonably, whatever that may
mean? To say the very least, the cases offer no consistent use of these words. The language slips and slides, and often the distinctions are totally lost in the shuffle. The best
we can offer is to set aside such words and try to use the terms "subjective" and "objective," whatever their faults may be, consistently in order to keep the distinction clear.
30. There is a temptation to think of the objective test as "stricter" or "more limiting" than the subjective test, though in theory this need not be true.They measure different things and in any given case the judgment of the party could pass either, neither,
or both of the tests. Just as we can imagine an unreasonable decision being honestly
made, we can envision a decision that is reasonable (a reasonable person could be dissatisfied with the matter to be judged), but not being honestly asserted.
In truth, the decision that the court must make is not between the two tests separately applied, but between applying the SUbjective test alone or applying the subjective
test along with the objective test.
31. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
32. That this is a question of fact to be weighed like any other, see note 52 infra.
33. Of course the party claiming dissatisfaction will want to put before the trier of
fact whatever information he can about how and why he made his final decision in order
to influence the determination that his decision was a reasonable one. He will attempt to
best articulate his own reasons for being dissatisfied and try to make them appear
"reasonable."
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traditionally stated, the objective test focuses exclusively on the outcome of the process, on whether the decision of dissatisfaction arrived
at coincides with the factfinder's belief as to what a "reasonable person" would have been dissatisfied with. This standard is further complicated by the refinement that the question be considered as it would
be by "a reasonable man in the position of the obligor,"3' although the
exact meaning of this qualification is not at all evident.311
Suppose that a man has contracted to pay another for painting the
exterior of his house a specific color with the contract providing that he
is to pay only if he is "satisfied with the job" upon completion. When
the painting is done it is found to have some minor cracks and drips,
but it can be shown that they are the types of imperfections that "always show up" on any such job, in that they are avoidable but normally tolerated in such exterior painting. Further, it is discovered that
the color the house has been painted is slightly different than the color
contracted for, although the difference is not one the average homeowner would be able to notice, much less care about. 38 Can the homeowner, honestly dissatisfied with the job, refuse:to pay? Would it make
a difference if his dissatisfaction with the workmanship stems from the
fact that he has for some unexplained and unexplainable reason a fear
of living in a home "all cracked and splotchy," or in other words that
he is supersensitive for no "good" reason? What if his sensitivity to
such defects arises from his own experience as a particularly careful
and meticulous painter of houses?37 If this is the case would it matter
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228. Surprisingly few cases even bother
to add this extra bit of verbiage and I have found none that discuss what it could mean.
Is this some reflection on how much sense it makes to pose the question altogether?
35. Neither the Comments nor the illustrations to the Restatement offer any assistance. What if the promisor finds himself (or has voluntarily placed himself) in a position of greater need than that of the average individual? What if he has finer tastes,
more rigid ways, or higher standards? In what instances will such information serve simply to clarify our understanding of his "position" rather than make him "unreasonable"?
Corbin at one point refers to the "experienced and reasonable man." 1 CORBIN, supra
note 4, § 150, at 670. Is the experienced individual harder or easier to satisfy? I suppose
how one answers that question is a measure of one's view of life, optimistic or pessimistic. What if our particular party is "inexperienced"? Should this work against him?
36. A wrong color would be a technical breach of the contract to paint the house the
specified color. As a result, our homeowner might prevail without having to rely upon the
satisfaction clause. However, difficulty will be encountered because of the doctrine of
substantial performance and the difficulty of proving damages for breach if the market
value of the house was not adversely affected by the color it was actually painted. See
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). Presumably, the very reason
our hypothetical homeowner wanted a satisfaction clause was because he had anticipated
this problem, was aware that his preferences were not those of the crowd, and felt he had
to somehow deal with his needs in a different manner.
37. This hypothetical is basically the same as that found in Professor Murray's treatise which will be discussed later. See text accompanying notes 266-67 infra. The courts

112

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

if he normally charged more for his especially neat services?
If the homeowner claims dissatisfaction with the color, should we

then ask what would be the attitude of "a reasonable man with a particularly fine sense of color?" If the answer seems clearly to be no, consider the possibility that the homeowner is a famous visual artist with
a sensitivity to slight variations of color and that the housepainter was
aware of this at the time of contracting. If the homeowner is a struggling unknown artist, with unrecognized promise as a colorist, is he entitled to his satisfaction any less? And what are we to say to the individual who has no particular reason for having a particularly fine eye
for color (he might even be a lawyer!), but who just does?SS
Before we go too far in trying to carefully particularize the reasonable person, we should probably get to know the breed in a general
way. Who is this reasonable person and what does he want? What
gives him satisfaction? Imagine yourself on a jury charged with deciding whether or not a reasonable person would have been satisfied with
the housepainting in the previous hypothetical. Since you know that
men may differ in their opinions, you realize that the real question is
whether every reasonable person would have been satisfied. Can you
conceive of a man acting in a reasonable manner who would not be
satisfied with paying for a job that he personally - and honestly did not like? Certainly that is not hard. You yourself, looking out for
your own best interests, would think yourself perfectly reasonable in
not paying for something you were actually dissatisfied with when that
is what your contract specifically allowed you to do, if the law would
allow you to get away without paying. The law would not make you
pay if you were acting reasonably. It all seems totally circular.
Indeed, the whole problem is circular if we try to view the question as whether the party acted reasonably in response to his own selfinterest. Fortunately, that does not seem to be the attitude of the law's
"reasonable person." He is not an individual primarily concerned with
himself. Rather, he is concerned (obsessed?) with the well being of
others. He is the common person with the average, normal community
standard of concern for others, and with the recognition that he must
act on that concern for the benefit of his fellows. An odd chap, he is
that rather dull, frightfully unexceptional person,s" who just happens
have held that a contract for the painting of a house is the kind to which the objective
test should be applied. Marcus v. Nelson, 119 N.Y.S. 1085 (App. Term 1909) (interior
painting); Miller v. Phillips, 39 R.I. 416, 98 A. 59 (1916) (exterior painting).
38. Such examples cannot be dismissed as farfetched. Who would be more likely to
insert a satisfaction clause into a house painting contract than a person who knows himself not to be satisfied with the types of imperfections which have come to be accepted,
perhaps even expected, by the ordinary buyer in the ordinary course of things?
39. "The person concerned is sometimes described as 'the man in the street' or 'the
man in the Clapham omnibus,' or •.. 'the man who takes the magazines at home, and in
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to be able to live his entire life up to the standard of that classic ideal,
the Golden Rule. He may be a bore, but he's also a saint, at least by
local community standards. So far as I know, the best expression of
this aspect of the reasonable person's basic nature is by the comic author A. P. Herbert in his recounting of the fictional case of Fardell v.
Potts, where he notes:
This noble creature stands in singular contrast to his kinsman
the Economic Man, whose every action is prompted by the single spur of selfish advantage and directed to the single end of
monetary gain. The Reasonable Man is always thinking of
others; prudence is his guide, and "Safety First," if I may borrow a contemporary catchword, is his rule of life."o
Considered in this light it is difficult to understand how easily this
figure has made his entry into the contract law over the last century!1
In tort law he represents the community's expectation that each of its
members has some responsibility to look out for the safety of others!2
What then is he doing in the contract law where the basic premise
would seem to be that parties are to look out for themselves, that this
promotion of action based on self-interest is a positive good? How, to
borrow Herbert's phrase, can he "stand in singular contrast to the Economic Man" when he is the Economic Man himself? In the law of contracts we may ask the Economic Man to modify his selfish goals to
some extent, demanding from him good faith, the absence of fraud and
duress and so forth, but what can it mean to go beyond this and demand of him "reasonable" behavior?"S
In the context of our discussions of conditions of personal satisfaction, the progressive adoption by the courts of a "reasonableness" requirement in many cases indicates a belief that the conditional promisor is in some way being unfair or oppressive to the other party by
insisting upon a standard of performance or quality greater than that
generally given in the situation and which has found acceptance by the
the evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.' " Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 K.B. 205, 224.
40. A. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 2-3 (1935).
41. On this point, see note 28 supra.
42. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 170-76 (4th ed. 1971).
43. In the context of our housepainting hypothetical, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra, consider how you, as a jury member, should decide whether a typical
member of our community with a good appreciation of his own self interest and tastes,
but with the appropriate amount of concern for the interests of the housepainter as expected by the community, would have been satisfied with the way this house was
painted. Remember, he is always aware, and he is aware the housepainter is aware, that
he is not to pay "if he is not satisfied" with the work done. This extended consideration
of the nature of the question before you certainly has not made your job as a juror any
easier.
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majority of the community."" This, despite the fact that both parties
contracted on the basis of his "satisfaction," being determinative. This
moralistic notion is hard to avoid in light of language that has often
worked its way into the decisions: "That which the law will say a contracting party ought in reason to be satisfied with, that the law will say
he is satisfied with.""11 In response, we naturally question, why? Would
it not be more forthright to say "that which the law will say a contracting party ought in reason to be satisfied with, that the law will say
he ought to be satisfied with." This certainly gives no justification for
the result. But what justification is there for the notion that a person
with a particularly fine sense of color or especially demanding taste
"ought to be satisfied" with something less than that which truly
pleases him merely for the sake of being "reasonable"? Is it "unreasonable" for a person to have perfect pitch when the rest of us trek
through life with something less? Or is it "unreasonable" for that person with perfect pitch to be discontented with a slightly sour tone?
Can the suggestion be that the law serves a legitimate and useful function by resolving that every person "ought to be satisfied" with that
which satisfies "the reasonable person" - perhaps a paragon of virtue
in many ways, but never before a leader in fashion or taste?48 We will
44. There may also be the feeling in such situations that the party must be lying
when he says he is dissatisfied, but that the other party cannot really be expected to
prove it. If this is the underlying concern, it is properly dealt with by the requirement of
honesty and good faith. That requirement has more teeth to it than people seem to im·
agine. See text accompanying notes 53-60 infra. In another context, Professor Alan
Schwartz has argued that the problem of bad faith rejection of goods (based on quality
defects in the goods but actually motivated by other reasons of the buyer) is not as great
as one might first imagine, at least in the case of the sale of goods to be used by the
purchaser. Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains,
16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 543, 557 (1975). Satisfaction clauses would presumably
almost always be in contracts of this type rather than in ones involving goods bought for
speculation.
45. City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 47 N.Y. 475, 479 (1872); Miesell v.
Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 115, 119 (1879). The language actually first appears in
these cases prior to the formal creation of the objective test in tlie 1880's, but is later
used in cases applying the test as an explanation of its origin. Breslow v. Gotham Sec.
Corp., 77 Misc. 2d 721, 723, 354 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (1974); Fessman v. Barnes, 108 S.W.
170, 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
46. We can wonder how likely it is that the objective test would have been adopted or
gained much support if it had been phrased to inquire what would satisfy the "normal
person" or the "person of typical needs and desires." Either of these is probably a more
correct characterization of what is really being sought. The objective test often seems to
gain credence because to fail it is to be found "unreasonable", which has strong antisocial connotations. But in this instance, at least, the opposite of "reasonable" would more
fairly be something like "unusual" or "atypical" which does not necessarily convey a
negative image. Pushing to the extreme, one could argue that having failed to be satisfied
by that which would satisfy "the unreasonable person" gives him the right to be consid·
ered "the discriminating person"; and then what have you?
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return to a consideration of whether an "objective test" is ever appropriately applied to a condition of personal satisfaction, and if so when
and why;" following an examination of the present state of the law and
how it got to be as it is.
ill. THE SUBJECTIVE TEST
To apply the subjective test to an obligation conditioned. upon
personal satisfaction is to say, in effect, that the person whose obligation is contingent on his satisfaction must perform if, after considering
whatever it is he is to consider, he actually is satisfied. We only ask
that the person come to some conclusion and report that conclusion
honestly and in good faith.48 The first aspect of the problem, that the
individual take stock of the situation, come to some definitive judgment and actually know his mind, is presumably a concern of the psychological sciences rather than the law. Contract law would, at least,
seem to work on the assumption, which would probably not be well
received in the world of modern psychology, that all of us can and will
be "honest" with ourselves as to how satisfied we are at any given
moment. 49
Thus, the legal inquiry is whether the individual, in making his
determination, has acted in good faith and is now honestly reporting
his decision to the other party. The important thing to emphasize here
is that this test has real substance. Although it has sometimes been
forgotten, GO the test does not permit a person to get out of his deal at
will or merely because he is willing to take the time and energy to
mouth his dissatisfaction. The simple statement of dissatisfaction is
never conclusive.G1 The question of a person's honesty in reporting his
It has been said that "[t]he reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to hinlself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man." G.B. SHAW, Man and Superman, Maxims For Revolutionists in COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES, VOL. III 739 (1963).
47. See text accolJlpanying notes 273-78 infra.
48. "Good faith, in contrast [to reasonableness], suggests a moral quality; its absence
is equated with dishonesty, deceit or unfaithfulness to duty." Guntert v. City of Stockton, 43 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211, 117 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 4, § 205, Comment a.
49. Suppose a buyer, having previously claimed dissatisfaction, felt compelled to testify under oath at trial: "I thought I was dissatisfied with it, but I realize now that I was
just in a bad mood because of something else." This is not that unusual a statement, but
what does it say about the person's "honesty" at the time of the initial expression of
dissatisfaction?
50. See, e.g., Crawford v. Mail and Express Pub. Co., 163 N.Y. 404, 57 N.E. 616
(1900). This case is criticized in 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 647, at 104-05.
51. Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 7 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1925); 3A
CORBIN, supra note 4, § 645, at 90; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment a (citing McCartney v. Badevinac, 62 Colo. 76, 160 P. 190 (1910».
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state of mind is capable of being det~rmined by the trier of fact like
any other question of fact.1I2
Moreover, a review of the cases suggests that the test has more
than theoretical significance. There is a temptation to conclude that
once any question has come down to whether a person has honestly
reported his state of mind, for all practical purposes that person is
home free regardless of the rule of law. In our case, how could a party
expect to successfully sustain the burden of proving the dishonesty of
his opponent's articulated unhappiness?IIS While there is no way to
know, of course, how often the realities of this situation have discouraged parties from challenging a brusque statement of dissatisfaction,
there is no lack of cases where the performing party has raised the
issue and won. M Application of the subjective test rarely leaves the
jury with nothing more than the look in his eye and the tremor in his
voice on which to judge the challenged party's conduct. The reported
cases reveal many factual situations that so richly detail the surrounding circumstances that inferences may be drawn concerning the party's
honesty or lack thereof.1I1I Often the facts make a conclusion of dishonesty not only supportable but virtually unavoidable.
For one thing the courts have held that even before considering
the question of whether the decision was honestly made, there is a re52. "This condition of personal satisfaction is a 'state of mind': but it is a fact that is
capable of proof like other facts." 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 644, at 80. That one party
may have to prove the other's "state of mind" at trial should not overly concern us. We
see it in other areas of contract law, for example, in the question of whether a claim
forborne can constitute consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 74. In
addition, a party's subjective intention "in remaining silent and inactive" may become
an issue of fact when the question is that of purported acceptance by silence. ld. §
69(I)(b). We note that, especially in this latter example, the party who finds himself in
the unenviable position of having to prove his opponent's state of mind can be said to
have brought it upon himself by the way he made the offer. ld. Comment c. Arguably,
someone who agrees to a contract where the other party will be obligated only if satisfied
is likewise responsible for whatever difficulties he may have as a litigant.
Professor Patterson argued in 1921 that the difficulty of proving a person's state of
mind was "probably less real today than it was in the time of [the Roman Jurist] Ulpian,
owing to the development of that deadly forensic weapon, cross-examination." Patterson,
supra note 2, at 146.
53. The burden of persuasion is on the party trying to prove that the claim of dissatisfaction was not honestly made. See Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202
F.2d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1953): Zeiss v. American Wringer Co., 62 App. Div. 463, 466. 70
N.Y.S. 1110, 1112 (2d Dep't 1901): Golden State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 380 S.W.2d 139,
141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964): 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 645, at 93. But see Patterson.
supra note 2, at 146-47 (burden of proof on party alleging dissatisfaction).
54. See, e.g., Coats v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. 2d 601, 81 P.2d 906 (1938); Diamond v. Mendelsohn, 156 A.D. 636, 141 N.Y.S. 775 (1st Dep't 1913).
55. See, e.g., Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.
1953): Van Demark v. California Home Extension Ass'n, 43 Cal. App. 685, 185 P. 866
(1919); Diamond v. Mendelsohn, 156 A.D. 636, 141 N.Y.S. 775 (1st Dep't 1913).
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quirement that the party to be satisfied go through the evaluation process in a good faith manner.lIs The work to be judged must be sufficiently completed so that its quality or character can be fairly
determined,1I7 and the judging party must have taken the opportunity
to actually view, test or consider the work.IIB Strictly speaking, this is
not a matter of honesty. A person may honestly believe that he has
seen enough or tested something long enough to make up his mind, but
the court may require something more. He must give the other party
"a fair chance to win him over." In other instances the party's lack of
good faith can be found by the trier of fact because the situation
presents ample evidence that the party's decision not to pay comes
from some other motivation.1I9 The party whose honesty is now being
questioned may, in fact, himself provide the evidence that defeats

him.so

The point is, of course, that when the question concerns a party's
honesty there is no reason to believe that the trial will necessarily degenerate into simply a credibility contest between the parties. Evidence of a concrete nature will often be available to the plaintiff to
help him prove his case. Can that include evidence of the "unreasonableness" of the defendant's articulated decision? The treatise writers
indicate it can.Sl There would seem to be no real objection to allowing
56. See, e.g., the series of early Vermont cases discussed in notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text infra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 205, illustration 7;
WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 675A, at 203-04.
57. Hood v. Meininger, 377 Pa. 372, 105 A.2d 126 (1954).
58. Hartford Sorghum Mfg. Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528 (1871); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 4, § 265, illustration 2.
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth Dep't of Property & Supplies v. Berger, 11 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 332, 312 A.2d 100 (1973) (clause used as an excuse to break lease); Kramer v. Philadelphia Leather Goods Corp., 364 Pa. 531, 73 A.2d 385 (1950) (employee-foreman fired
after project was abandoned); Studner v. H. & N. Carburetor Co., 230 N.Y. 534, 130 N.E.
883 (1920) (carburetor for which employee was sales manager was defective and
unmarketable).
60. See, e.g., Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N.J.L. 419, 103 A. 23 (1918). In Williams, the
defendant had agreed to pay for a cellar's waterproofing "after a rain and a satisfactory
test" had been made. [d., 103 A. at 23. The court held that the relevant question was one
of the defendant's personal satisfaction, id. at 420, 103 A. at 24, but affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff contractor as the defendant's statements and conduct indicated that the
defendant himself thought that the water which came into the basement after a rain had
come in through the windows and not because of any defect in the work done. [d., 103 A.
at 24. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 265, Illustration 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 4, § 228, illustration 2.
61. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 11-18, at 403; SA CORBIN supra note 4, §
647, at 106. Corbin also makes a statement that is probably the greatest truth of the
matter: the jury will probably take this into account whatever might be the rule of law.
[d. § 645, at 92. Perhaps we should inquire further as to what is meant by "evidence of
unreasonableness." It may mean evidence about the physical or other actual characteristics of the thing being judged. This would seem clearly admissible and has been so held.
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a jury to consider evidence of how others would value the thing or situation to be judged, or how they themselves would view it, provided
that they are clearly instructed as to their duty to determine the honesty of the one party and nothing more. It would even be acceptable
for them to make a finding of dishonesty when this is the only evidence
offered on the issue of honesty other than the statement, under oath,
of the party to be satisfied, that he was not satisfied. Once that party
has articulated his own reasons for his decision, however, the jury must
be careful to judge only whether he is being honest in what he says,
r,ather than reasonable in what he thinks. They must distinguish between the party's having his own reasons that truly motivate his behavior, however nonsensical they would seem to others, and his having
reasonable reasons, the kind that would sway the reasonable person.
It is often stated that the judgment must concern the subject matter of the condition and not the underlying bargain.es What does this
mean? What could it mean? It may mean that dissatisfaction with
some other aspect of the contract, or with life in general at the moment, cannot be masked by a simple statement of dissatisfaction, when
indeed the performance in issue is perfectly acceptable to the judging
party. This statement is merely another way of phrasing the requirement of honest judgment and good faith dealing. A party cannot be
honest in saying he is dissatisfied with a performance or product when
what he is actually thinking is that he could get the same or similar
quality, which is perfectly acceptable to him, at a lower price or on
more favorable terms.
On the other hand, the statement that the judgment is to be of the
performance and not the bargain may mean more, suggesting that the
human mind is able to make a determination of satisfaction completely
out of the context of the bargain. Is this really possible? I can conceive
of myself, very dissatisfied with a meal at an elegant restaurant, advising all within earshot of my dissatisfaction and yet gobbling down the
same food without a thought (or a murmur) at the local diner. At the
posh establishment I would probably be pointing to (and truly thinkFursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 A.D.2d 447, 200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't
1960). The question appears different when the evidence offered is of the subjective
judgment, expert or not, of others.
62. Western Hills, Oregon Ltd. v. Pfau, 265 Or. 137, 144, 508 P.2d 201, 204 (1973):
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, Comment a. The Oregon Supreme Court has
noted:
It does not follow, however, that dissatisfaction with other aspects of the
bargain as well means a party is acting in bad faith. • • • If one of the
sources of dissatisfaction gives him a right under thecontract to repudiate,
the fact that thereare other sources of dissatisfaction is immaterial.
Columbia Christian College, Inc. v. Commonwealth Properties, Inc., 286 Or. 321, 332, 594
P.2d 401, 407-08 (1979).
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ing about> what I found wanting in the food, demonstrating the limited
expertise I have on matters of seasoning, quality of ingredients and
preparation, without actually focusing on the plebian matter of price.
It probably would not occur to me to state, "1 like it, but not at these
prices!" My mind would focus on other things. Moreover, imagine how
satisfying the same food would be, at whatever the price, if I had just
been through a long period of starvation. It would seem best to consider the requirement that the party to be satisfied judge the subject
matter apart from the bargain as only a further articulation of the
need for good faith· and honesty in the process of making the
judgment.
IV. THE ORIGINS OF THE OBJECTIVE TEsT.ANn How IT GREW
While some early nineteenth century cases could be read as suggesting that the conditional promisor had a duty to act "reasonably" in
deciding whether or not he had been satisfied, the modern conception
of a generalizable objective test, distinct from the requirements of good
faith and honesty, and applicable to a particularly defined class of
cases, seems clearly to be the direct result of two cases decided in the
1880's. Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden,es was decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in 1886, and Hawkins v. Graham,64 was decided
in 1889 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in an opinion
written by Justice Holmes.8G A thorough examination of these cases,
and an appreciation of the novelty and creativity of their results, requires an initial inquiry into the law as it stood at the time of their
decision.
A. The Subjective Test Stands Alone
By the early 1880's the American decisions which appear to have
been the most generally known and widely accepted were ones utilizing
the subjective test without hesitation and not even hinting at the use
of any other standard. The most famous of these cases is Brown v.
Foster,66 in which the defendant ordered a custom-made suit of clothes
63. 101 N.Y. 387, 4 N.E. 749 (1886).
64. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889).
65. That a significant change in the American law of contracts took place in the
1880's and that Holmes (along with Langdell and Williston as we shall see) had a role in
that change will come as no surprise to readers of Professor Gilmore. G. Gn.MORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). The spirited controversy that this work has generated is
reviewed in Danzig, The Death of Contract and The Life of The Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1977). Those
with a particular interest in the debate will want to read the historical material that
follows with an especially keen eye for information to bolster their side of the argument.
This author's reactions to the particular material will, I assume, be clear from the text.
See also note 196 infra.
66. 113 Mass. 136 (1873).
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from the plaintiff, a tailor, under an agreement that the clothes were to
be made to his satisfaction. After the suit was delivered to the defendant, he returned it, stating that it did not fit and was unsatisfactory
to him. Apparently the clothes were not a perfect fit.67 The defendant
consented to model them before the judge and jury.68 The plaintiff
called several tailors as experts who testified that the clothes did indeed need some alterations before they could be called a "good fit,"
but that such alterations could easily be made without damage to the
suit.69 The plaintiff offered further evidence that as soon as the clothes
had been returned to him he had written the defendant offering to
make the necessary alterations, and even to entirely remake the coat
and vest if necessary.70 The defendant replied "that the clothes were
unsatisfactory to him as they were, and that he would not accept them
after they had been worked over and botched up, and refused to allow
the plaintiff to make a new suit, or to accept any alterations to the suit
already made." 7l Evidence was also introduced showing the custom existing among tailors of making alterations on garments after an initial
fitting. 72 A verdict for the plaintiff for the price of the suit was reversed
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Justice Devens, writing
for the court, stated:
If the plaintiff saw fit to do work upon articles for the defendant and to furnish materials therefor, contracting that the articles, when manufactured, should be satisfactory to the defendant, he can recover only upon the contract as it was made;
and even if the articles furnished by him were such that the
other party ought to have been satisfied with them, it was yet
in the power of the other party to reject them as unsatisfactory. It is not for anyone else to decide whether a refusal to
accept is or is not reasonable, when the contract permits the
67. Id. at 137.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The jury had been instructed at trial that if the plaintiff had agreed to make the
clothes to the satisfaction of the defendant, he was bound to do so, with these
qualifications:
[I1f, when the clothes were delivered, there were defects in the fit of them,
such as are liable to occur in first-class tailoring establishments, but such
as could easily be remedied, and a custom among tailors has been proved,
to remedy such defects when they occur, the plaintiff was entitled to a
reasonable opportunity therefore, and if he was willing and offered to
remedy said defects and the defendant refused to allow him to do so, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover if the other facts of the case have been
proved.
Id. at 138.
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defendant to decide himself whether the articles furnished are
to his satisfaction. Although the compensation of the plaintiff
for valuable service and materials may thus be dependent upon
the caprice of another who unreasonably refuses to accept the
articles manufactured, yet he cannot be relieved from the contract into which he has voluntarily entered.78
It is important to note that there is no suggestion from Justice Devens

that the reasonableness criterion might have been differently received
had the subject matter of the contract been something else. Nor did he
emphasize the fact that the subject matter of the contract involved an
item of the type normally reflecting personal taste and sensibility. Mter all, the controversy centered on the fit of the clothes rather than
styling or color, and the court had no apparent difficulty with the fact
that tailors had been called upon as "experts" to testify as to the fit
and on the custom of alteration in general.
Two other cases in different jurisdictions decided soon after Brown
became equally well known. In Zaleski v. Clark,74 the defendant had
ordered a bust of her deceased husband to be made to her satisfaction
from a photograph. Apparently her dissatisfaction centered on the fact
that the resulting work was not as lifelike as had been her husband.75
Here too a judgment for the performing party in the lower court was
reversed,76 the court expressing its decision as simply a refusal to let
the sculptor out of a contract he had bound himself to and a risk he
73. Id. at 138-39. Justice Devens cited as his sole authority an earlier Massachusetts
case, McCarren v. McNulty, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139 (1856), in which a workman had been
unsuccessful in obtaining relief against the committee members of a church's Young
Men's Society. The defendants agreed to pay for a bookcase of a specified kind and size
which was to be built "in a good, strong and workmanlike manner, to the satisfaction of
the president of the society." [d. at 140. The court had held that the defendants could
not be liable as the president of the society had never approved the work, saying of the
workman "[a]gainst the consequences resulting from his own bargain, the law can afford
him no relief." Id. at 141.
74. 44 Conn. 218 (1876).
75. Id. at 219. According to the trial court:
The bust was a fine piece of work, was a correct copy of the photograph,
and accurately represented and portrayed the features of the deceased.
The only fault found with it was that it did not have the expression of the
deceased during his life, and this the court found from the evidence to
have resulted not from any imperfection in the workmanship, but from
the nature of a bust as a dead white model, and necessarily destitute of
the expression of color and life. The defendant was not satisfied with it,
but her dissatisfaction was caused by reasons which would have applied to
any bust whatever, and not to this as distinguished from any other.
Id. For the stirring argument by counsel for the plaintiff invoking, in verse form, "the
case with Pygmalion of mythological renown," see id. at 223.
76. Id. at 220.
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had knowingly undertaken.'17 In Gibson v. Cranage,'18 the Supreme
Court of Michigan was no more solicitous to the plight of a painter
who had contracted to paint an enlarged portrait from a photograph
and failed to satisfy his customer. While both cases involved artistic
work of the type which we would probably readily admit to being subject to individual taste and fancy (although it might be remarked that
each involved artistic reproductions and not original works), neither
court saw this aspect of the facts as worthy of special mention, nor
does it appear to have influenced either outcome in any way.
Two decisions decided only months before Duplex Safety Boiler
Co. v. Garden,79 provide a clear impres~ion of what the courts of the
time considered to be the law applicable to conditions of personal satisfaction. In Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Town of Chico,sO a manufacturer, agreeing to furnish a steam fire engine to the California town of Chico, warranted that the apparatus would be satisfactory to the town. Mter a
lengthy examination of the facts of the case and particularly those relating to the decision of a Mr. Noonan, the swing vote on the fire committee, the court concluded that in its opinion the committee "ought to
have been satisfied" but that the manufacturer had failed to prove "by
a preponderance of the evidence that Noonan was in fact satisfied, and,
notwithstanding his convictions, in bad faith fraudulently reported
that he was not satisfied."BI
77. ld. at 224.
78. 39 Mich. 49 (1878).
79. 101 N.Y. 387, 4 N.E. 749 (1886). Duplex was decided on February 9, 1886. ld., 4
N.E. at 749. Silsby was decided September 7,1885.24 F. at 893. Singerly was filed October 5, 1885. 108 Pa. at 291, 2 A. at 230.
80. 24 F. 893 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
81. ld. at 897. The court's entire discussion of the law on the point is found at the
beginning of its opinion.
The authorities are abundant to the effect that upon a contract containing
a provision that an article to be made and delivered shall be satisfactory
to the purchaser, it must be satisfactory to him, or he is not required to
take it. It is not enough that he ought to be satisfied with the article; he
must be satisfied, or he is not bound to accept it. Such a contract may be
unwise, but of its wisdom the party so contracting is to be his own judge,
and if he deliberately enters into such an agreement he must abide by it.
ld. at 894 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Interestingly, the decision also held
that the committee to be satisfied was the one in existence at the time of performance
and the tender of the fire engine, despite the fact that two of the three members of the
committee (including Noonan) had not been members at the time the contract was entered into. Thus, the manufacturer was held to have bound himself to actually satisfy a
group of persons whose identities were unknown to him, and not ascertainable, at the
time of contracting. See also Adams Radiator & Boiler Works, Ltd. v. Schnader, 155 Pa.
394, 26 A. 745 (1893) (defendant, as executor and devisee of the original purchaser, was
the person to be satisfied).
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In Singerly v. Thayer,s'}. which was to become the leading Pennsylvania case on the subject, Thayer had contracted to install, for a price
of $2,300, his newly patented hydraulic elevator system in a new building Singerly was constructing. His proposal, accepted by the building
owner, included the phrase "warranted satisfactory in every respect."ss
During the construction period, the elevator mechanism was used for
hoisting materials, workmen and occasional passengers. It proved unsatisfactory to the owner. Evidence produced by the owner at trial included testimony that on almost every trip it would drop suddenly
from the sixth to the third floor, and additional testimony of the building's architect that he "came to the conclusion that it would never do
as a passenger elevator on which ladies were to ride."M The owner notified the elevator's builder that he desired the system's removal, and in
fact offered a cash inducement of $500 to that end. When the manufacturer refused to do so, the owner removed the elevator system himself.SII In an action by Thayer for the contract price, the trial judge
instructed the jury that the contract required only that the work have
been done in a workmanlike manner and that "the elevator, when completed, shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended
and shall accomplish the purpose for which it was intended with a reasonable degree of perfection."s6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed judgment for the manufacturer in a lengthy and sharply
worded opinion critical of any deviation from a standard of good faith
alone. The court concluded:

It may have been very unwise in the maker of this elevator to
agree to expend labor and furnish materials, and rely for payment on the uncertain approval of one so largely interested in
determining whether it was satisfactory to himself. Having,
however, entered into a contract whereby he did run the risk,
his legal rights are to be determined thereby.s7
By the mid-1880's, the only widely known American cases which
might possibly have given support to the reading of a "reasonableness"
component into personal satisfaction conditions were two Vermont
cases decided in the previous decade.88 But in 1886 the Vermont Su82. 108 Pa. 291, 2 A. 230 (1885).
83. Id. at 292, 2 A. at 231.
84. Id. at 299, 2 A. at 234.
85. Id. at 293, 2 A. at 232.
86. Id. at 293, 2 A. at 231.
87. Id. at 299, 2 A. at 234 (citing McCarren v. McNulty, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139
(1856».
88. Daggett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345 (1877); Hartford Sorghum Mfg. Co. v. Brush, 43
Vt. 528 (1871). The idea that these two cases point to a different rule in Vermont is
found in a textual note in the American Reporter's version of Gibson v. Cranage, 39
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preme COurt, in McClure Brothers v. Briggs,se put to rest any suggestion that a different test had been adopted in that state and cited with
approval the staunchly anti-objectivist cases of the period."o Certainly
the purely subjective standard had never seemed more secure, the
trend being towards less patience by the courts for any argument based
on what we would call the objective standard. This little piece of the
world, at least, was safe from the demands of the reasonable person
and his reasonable expectations.el
B. The Duplex Decision
Against this backdrop, in 1886, the New York Court of Appeals
issued its decision in Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden," which,
along with Justice Holmes' later decision in Hawkins v. Graham," was
to change this trend. In Duplex, the defendants had contracted with
the plaintiff for certain specified repairs to boilers already in their
building, agreeing to pay $700 for labor and materials "as soon as we
are satisfied that the boilers, as changed, are a success, and will not
leak under a pressure on one hundred pounds of steam."H Few facts
beyond these are provided by the court of appeals other than that the
work was not paid for when completed and that the defendants continued to use the boilers "without objection or complaint.'teJ With only
Mich. 49 (1878). Note, 33 AM. REP. 353-54 (1831). Similarly, it is found in the text in the
early Atlantic Reporter's presentation of Singerly. Note, 2 A. 235 (1836). In Wood Reaping & Mowing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565, 570, 15 N.W. 906, 909 (1883), the two
are cited as examples of a class of cases, to be contrasted with the long run of purely
subjective cases, where "the promisor is supposed to undertake that he will act reasonably and fairly, and found his determination on grounds that are just and sensible." Id.,
15 N.W. at 909. See also note 119 infra, for a discussion of Smith v. Buffalo Street R.R.
Co., 35 Hun. 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
Exactly how these cases came to be seen as standing for a "contrary result" is hard
to understand. In Hartford Sorghum, the Vermont Supreme Court specifically stated
that the buyer "was not to determine what would be the wishes of ordinary persons
under like circumstances, and therefore was not bound to use the care and skill of ordinary persons making the determination." 43 Vt. at 532. In Daggett the court found the
buyer, in effect, failed in his obligation of good faith since he indicated dissatisfaction
without every having put to the test the equipment for the use for which it was intended.
49 Vt. at 345.
89. 58 Vt. 82, 2 A. 583 (1886).
90. See Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218 (1876); Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873);
McCarren v. McNulty, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139 (1856).
91. Other cases during the same year which spoke strictly in subjective terms are
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. 198, 9 A. 126 (1886) (contract to furnish coal
daily to railroad company) and Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 66
Wis. 218, 28 N.W. 343 (1886) (sale of exhaust fans for blacksmith's shop).
92. 101 N.Y. 387, 4 N.E. 749 (1886).
93. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889).
94. 101 N.Y. at 389, 4 N.E. at 749.
95. ld. at 390, 4 N.E. at 750.
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this information it is not difficult to see why the court affirmed the
judgment for the plaintiff. Even though Judge Danforth, writing for
the court of appeals, had to labor mightily to find authority to justify
the decision, the impetus for the result is clear. This appears to be a
blatant case of the defendants, once the repairs were completed, brazenly attempting to use the condition of personal satisfaction in the
contract to avoid paying the agreed price, and in essence, hoping to get
something for nothing. If we go beyond the sketchy facts provided by
Judge Danforth, however, and examine the record of the case on appeal, we can easily question whether this really is what it first appears
to be.
The testimony is conflicting on some points, but it does seem possible to get an understanding of what actually happened, at least from
the defendants' point of view. This puts the defendants in a far more
favorable light than the court of appeals' scanty version of the facts.
The defendants, dissatisfied with some boilers which had been installed in their hat factory~ even considered having them completely
removed and replaced.86 The plaintiff agreed to do repairs on the boilers, primarily to protect the reputation of that type of equipment.87
When completed, the repairs did stop the boilers from leaking, but this
problem had been termed by the court to be, at most, an "annoyance"
to the defendants.86 Their main economic complaint had been "the
very large and undue consumption of coal,"88 and this was unaffected
by the work. loo The repairs, in their eyes at least, were a big bust.
With all this before it, the court sustained the verdict for the
plaintiff, putting together a motley assortment of arguments. The discussion of the law begins:
Performance must, of course, accord with the terms of the contract; but if the defendants are at liberty to determine for
themselves when they are satisfied, there would be no obligation, and consequently no agreement which could be enforced.
It cannot be presumed that the plaintiff entered upon its work
with this understanding, nor that the defendants supposed
they were to be the sole judge in their own cause. On the contrary, not only does the law presume that for services rendered
remuneration shall be paid, but here the parties have so
agreed. The amount and manner of compensation are fixed;
96. Case on Appeal at 14.
97. Id. at 5, 14.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 14, 17. There was even evidence which leads one to believe the plaintiff had
not done one of the alterations specifically called for in the agreement, "raising both
boilers enough to give ample fire space." Id. at 5-6, 8, 14-17.
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time of payment is alone uncertain. lOI
This initial suggestion, that leaving the defendants free to decide their
own satisfaction in effect renders the entire agreement unenforceable,
is one which had given the courts some concern in the early part of the
nineteenth century,102 but by the time of Duplex, one would not have
thought it still deserved attention, at least not so long as the possibility
of utilizing the good faith standard existed. In none of the other cases
discussed in this section up to this point was the consideration problem even thought worthy of mention. That a promise to pay if satisfied
could serve to make a counterpromise enforceable seemed long settled. los The second suggestion offered in Duplex, that the satisfaction
provision was not a condition precedent to the obligation to pay at all
but merely a time-fixing provision,lo. is an interesting one and may
even be right. The question is presumably one of interpretation of the
parties' intention, and Judge Danforth's opinion provides little support
for his determination. The record on appeal makes this interpretation
less likely. 1011 But even if it were right to consider this only a timefixing provision it really does not provide any help in answering the
question before the court. If the defendants' satisfaction is to measure
anything-though to read the provision as one relating only to the time
of payment arguably makes it meaningless and superfluous languagel08_how then is the satisfaction to be measured? The problem
still remains. Is it when the defendants actually are satisfied or when
they "ought to be"?
While this limited reading of the satisfaction provision could have
been used to avoid the whole issue,107 Judge Danforth showed no hesitancy to enter the fray. He immediately reached back to the case of
101. 101 N.Y. at 389, 4 N.E. at 749-50.
102. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
104. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 227, Comment b.
105. A review of the Case on Appeal and the briefs for both parties finds no mention
of this possibility.
106. It is generally held that if language creates only a time-fixing provision, nonoccurrence of the event (here the defendants,' being satisfied) will not discharge the obligation (here their obligation to pay), but the obligation will arise within a reasonable time
after it is ascertained that the event will not come about. See, e.g., Mularz v. Greater
Park City Co., 623 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1980). In Duplex, therefore, this reading would
mean that the defendants were bound to pay, whether they liked it or not, within a
reasonable time after completion of the repairs. If so, the result would be the same as if
they had left out the satisfaction clause entirely, ending up with a contract for repair
with no provision as to time of payment.
107. In the British case of Dallman v. King, 4 Bing. N.C. 105, 132 Eng. Rep. 729
(1837), discussed at note 162 infra, a sinillar reading of the satisfaction clause was used
to avoid, in effect, determining how "satisfaction" was to be interpreted.
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Folliard v. Wallace,loa decided by Chancellor Kent in 1807. Folliard
involved a contract to pay for land previously conveyed three months
after the buyer was "well satisfied" that he held the land "undisputed
by any person whatsoever.moa The defendant had argued that he was
not satisfied with the title because of an outstanding claim. The court,
in granting judgment for the seller, stated:

Nor will it do for the defendant to say that he was not
satisfied with his title, without showing some lawful encumbrance or claim existing against it. A simple allegation of dissatisfaction, without some good reason assigned for it, might be
a mere pretext, and cannot be regarded. If the defendant were
at liberty to judge for himself when he was satisfied, it would
totally destroy the obligation and the agreement would be absolutely void. But here was a real obligation contracted, and
the true and sound principle is laid down in Pothier, (Traite
des Obligations, No. 48) that if A promises to give something
to B in case he should judge it reasonable, it is not left to A's
choice to give it or not, since he is obliged to do so, in case it be
reasonable. The law in this case will determine for the defendant when he ought to be satisfied . . . . 110
Thus, Chancellor Kent coupled the mutuality notion with a citation to
Pothier, a leading writer on the civil law whose treatise on the law of
obligations had been translated into English only a few years earlier.111
Professor Patterson, after tracing the evolution of the Roman and civil
law on this problem back to Justinian,1111 credited Chancellor Kent
(though credited is probably not the right word) with having lifted the
notion of an objective test "bodily from the pages of Pothier and transplanted it to the uncongenial soil of the Anglo-American law of
contract. "113
108. 2 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1807).
109. ld. at 396.
110. ld. at 402-03.
111. Professor Milsom places the earliest translation of Pothier's Treatise on the
Law of Obligations into English in 1802. Milsom, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J. 1685 n.14
(1975).
112. Patterson, supra note 2, at 142-45.
113. ld. at 144. Patterson continued:
Thus, though an unfortunate borrowing by New York's distinguished
Chancellor of a Roman law doctrine which is now thoroughly exploded in
the two leading countries of the modem Roman law there has developed
the peculiar New York view (adopted in a number of other states)
whereby as Professor Williston says, "a broad and artificial meaning" is
given to promises of this sort, with the result that many of the New York
decisions are hopelessly irreconcilable.
ld. at 145 (footnotes omitted).
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The real responsibility for the innovation of the objective test in
this country would seem to be better given to Judge Danforth rather
than to Chancellor Kent. It was Judge Danforth's idea to resurrect this
otherwise all-but-forgotten Folliard opinion,114 with little regard for
the course of the law in the intervening eighty years. As Patterson
noted, he seemed to find the importance of Folliard in its concern for
the possibility that the defendant could evade liability by "a simple
allegation of dissatisfaction" which "might be a mere pretext and cannot be regarded. "llG But by this time the courts had encountered any
number of cases where this woUld have been a problem and had obviously concluded that the test of good faith and honest judgment was
sufficient to protect any seller who had put himself knowingly in this
position.116 Judge Danforth was correct in pointing out that Folliard
had been cited in two contemporary cases, 117 although the suggestion
that each stands for the adoption of the objective test is probably misleading. 118 What he failed to deal with or in great part to even acknowledge was the large number of cases since Folliard which had ignored that case entirely and relied on the exclusive use of the
subjective standard with no qualms. 119 His response to cases like
One of the footnotes omitted from this passage deserves special recognition: "In a
remarkable letter discovered about 1897 at Jackson, Miss., Chancellor Kent explains that
he was wont to mystify his less learned colleagues by expounding to them the doctrines
of the Civil Law." ld. at n.75 (citations omitted).
114. Cases similar to Folliard concerning contracts for the sale of land with an agree·
ment to provide "satisfactory title," are the subject of Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 455 (1956).
This annotation cites several cases decided between the time of Folliard and Duplex. Of
these, only one cites Folliard. None of the New York cases do. Folliard was not cited in
plaintiff's brief to the court of appeals in Duplex. In fact, their brief cites no cases
whatsoever.
115. Patterson, supra note 2, at 144-45.
116. See, e.g., Lynn v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 60 Md. 404 (1883). See also text ac·
companying notes 66-91 supra.
117. 101 N.Y. 387, 390, 4 N.E. 749, 750 (1886).
118. City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 47 N.Y. 475, 479 (1872), involved
the enforcement of a promise made to the city by a contractor laying railroad track to
keep pavement under good repair "under the direction of such competent authority as
the common council may designate." ld. at 480. The city, having been held liable to a
traveller for his wrecked wagon, sued the contractor on this promise. The case had noth·
ing to do with a condition on payment for the contractor's services. The citation of Fol·
liard in Miesell v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 115, 119 (1879), was clearly dictum.
119. McKenzie v. Decker, 94 N.Y. 650 (1884); Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co., 24 Hun.
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1881); Wilson v. Gould, 21 Hun. 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); Gray v.
Central R.R. Co., 11 Hun. 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877); Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly 42 (N.Y.
Ct. C.P. 1875); Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); Heron v. Davis, 3 Bosw.
336 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1858); Hart v. Hart, 22 Barb. 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
To be fair we must acknowledge Smith v. Buffalo Street R.R. Co., 35 Hun. 204 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1885), where the court, in dictum, after discussing the general line of subjective
cases, noted that there are some cases in New York which "look in a different direction."
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Brown, Zaleski and Gibson and similar New York casesl20 is not very
helpful.

Another rule has prevailed, where the object of a contract
was to gratify taste, serve personal convenience, or satisfy individual preference. In either of these cases the person for whom
the article is made, or the work done, may properly determine
for himself -if the other party so agree - whether it shall be
accepted. Such instances are cited by the appellants. One who
makes a suit of clothes or undertakes to fill a particular place
as agent, mold a bust, or paint a portrait, may not unreasonably be expected to be bound by the opinion of his employer,
honestly entertained. A different case is before us, and in regard to it no error has been shown.l21
The notion that the prior rule was reserved for cases of taste, personal
convenience or "individual preference" is the basis for the fundamental
division of contracts containing conditions of personal satisfaction into
two types that was soon to become popular.ls2 Even assuming for the
moment that such a distinction makes any sense whatsoever, it had to
be known to Judge Danforth that none of the cases he mentioned as
holding to the subjective test attached any importance to this aspect of
the contracts involved. Beyond this, he failed to acknowledge the prior
New York case of Gray v. Central R.R. Co., that had involved a contract for the purchase of a steamboat "provided, upon trial, [the buyers] are satisfied with the soundness of the machinery, boilers, etc."na
Gray was adamant on the exclusive use of the subjective test, and this
was in a case where the question of satisfaction was expressly limited
to matters of a mechanical nature. When is a boiler different from a
boiler?1U And how different was the boiler in Duplex from the mechanism of a hydraulic elevator or a fire engine? Judge Danforth does not
even mention Singerly or Silsby.m. It seems fair to characterize the
[d. at 207. This discussion, however, depends to some extent on the court's belief that
there existed a different "Vermont Rule." [d. As we have seen, within a year the Vermont Court would disavow any such idea. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
120. Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lana. 280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly 42
(N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1875).
121. 101 N.E. at 390, 4 N.E. at 755.
122. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 199:220 infra.
123. 11 Hun. 71, 73 (N.Y. 1877).
124. For yet one more boiler case, see Adams Radiator & Boiler Works, Ltd. v.
Scluiader, 24 F. 893 (1885) (boiler for household heater was to be judged by subjective
standard alone).
125. Of course anything can have an aesthetic or decorative component. Certainly the
design of an elevator is not all functional mechanical elements. But note that in Singerly
the contract covered only the hydraulic elevator system. The passenger car was not included in the contract. 108 Pa. at 299, 2 A. at 233. See also Campbell Printing Co., v.
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Duplex result and opinion as a great "creative" leap; whether the court
made that leap consciously or with full appreciation of where it was to
land is impossible to say.12S
C. Oliver Wendel Holmes and the Case of Hawkins v. Graham
The decision rendered by Justice Holmes for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Hawkins v. Graham,127 is surely no less remarkable than Duplex in what it accomplished, though far more elegant in the way it goes about it. Once again, the dispute involved a
boiler. Hawkins, the plaintiff, had offered to provide a heating system
for Graham's new mills located in Philadelphia. The offer, which Graham accepted and which the court ruled as constituting the terms of
the contract,128 included Hawkins' agreement to install a system which
would meet certain heating criteria "for and in consideration of the
sum of fifteen hundred and seventy-five (1575) dollars, to be paid to
me upon the satisfactory completion" of the work.129 The offer concluded with the following language:

It is further declared, and distinctly understood, that in the
event of my not being able to properly heat every portion of
the building as hereinbefore provided for, and in accordance
with the requirements as above set forth, upon a ten (10) days'
notice from yourself, to the effect that the buildings are not
being properly and sufficiently heated, and I cannot heat it in
Thorp, 36 F. 414 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888), for what the writer of the opinion himself "regard[s] as an accurate summary of the whole law on the subject." ld. at 418. The case
applied the subjective test alone to a contract for printing presses and refers to a great
range of cases from the period prior to Duplex which applied only the subjective standard to contracts for mechanical objects, ranging from a harvesting machine or machine
for generating gas to a grain binder, cord binder, or fanning mill. The opinion acknowledged Duplex and the cases on which that opinion is based, but found "the difference
more apparent than real," id. at 416, and applied what it believed still to be the accurate
rule with no hesitancy. ld.
126. The adoption of the objective test in New York got a boost with a second case,
offering a different rationale. Doll v. Noble, 116 N.Y. 30, 22 N.E. 406 (1889), also concerned a condition of personal satisfaction. The court first cited one of the long line of
New York cases involving contracts calling for the satisfaction of a third-party such as an
architect. The New York rule on such contracts, contrary to the general rule which prohibits inquiry into the architect's decision other than on the question of honesty and
good faith, would allow consideration of the "reasonableness" of the architect's judgment. CALAMARI & PEIm.LO, supra note 7, §§ 11-17. The leading New York case on this
point was decided only seven years before Doll v. Noble. Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 648
(1882). Having laid out this rule in the third-party satisfaction cases, the court in Doll v.
Noble concluded, "the reason for the exception to the requirement that the architect be
satisfied and issue a certificate applies with much greater force where the work is to be
done to the satisfaction of the party himself ...... 116 N.Y. at 233,22 N.E. at 407.
127. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889).
128. ld. at 285, 21 N.E. at 313.
129. ld., 21 N.E. at 313.
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ten days thereafter, I shall and will at my own expense remove
all machines and appurtenances belonging to the system, leaving the entire mill in a condition equal to that prior to the introduction of the same. In this event, no charges of any kind
will be made by me on account of any kind of aforesaid work;
it being distinctly understood that the providing of the entire
system is to be done at my own risk absolutely. In the event of
the system proving satisfactory, and conforming with all the
requirements as above provided for, the sum of $1,575 as above
provided for to be paid me, after such acknowledgement has
been made by the owner or the work demonstrated. ISO
Mter reproducing the contract in full, Holmes' opinion noted the
finding of the trial judge that the case did not come within the scope of
Brown v. Foster,181 and that the trial was to proceed "on the theory
that the satisfaction of the defendant was eliminated from the case."laS
Evidence which the defendant had offered to show his dissatisfaction
was ruled immaterial. The plaintiff apparently did give evidence of the
system's performance, which inexplicably included the information
that the temperature in various parts of the mill varied by as much as
ten degrees. ISS The judge gave no instructions whatsoever on the question of satisfaction and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.lM
These are the facts provided by the opinion, and there is a temptation as in Duplex, to view the situation as one in which the equities
are all in the plaintiff's favor. But again a review of the record on appeal fleshes out the situation and gives us more to consider. Among
other things it helps to understand what does read like a rather odd
contract. The concluding language of the agreement, by which the contractor agreed to remove the entire heating system if it was not prop130. [d. at 285-86, 1 N.E. at 312. The Northeastern Reporter does not contain the
more extensive set of the facts or prior history that is available in the official reporter.
131. 113 Mass. 136 (1873). See notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
132. 149 Mass. 286-87, 1 N.E. at 312. The papers available relating to this appeal do
not include the trial court's opinion, so we cannot ascertain why the judge thought that
element "eliminated" from the case. The plaintiff's Brief to the Supreme Judicial Court
indicates that the lower court had agreed with an argument by the plaintiff that "satisfaction" was not the same as "satisfactory to the defendant" in this case and hence this
was not a case like Brown. Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Hawkins v. Gr~, 49 Mass. at 287,
21 N.E. at 312-13. Note that Justice Holmes in his opinion distingushed IJrown, but not
on the basis of the particular language chosen. See text accompanying notes 140-43
infra.
133. 149 Mass. at 287, 21 N.E. at 312-13. The court presumably obtained this information from Defendant's Bill of Exceptions. One can only assume that the information
about the temperature fluctuation was not offered willingly by the plaintiff but was
brought out in the cross-examination of a witness for plaintiff who had testified on the
completeness of the system.
134. [d. at 286, 21 N.E. at 313.
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erly functioning and stating that installation was being done at his risk
"absolutely," is difficult to comprehend. The contemporary reader is
apt to dismiss it as merely formalistic boiler-plate language from a bygone era, and perhaps it is. But consider the following language from
the defendant's brief on appeal, nowhere contradicted in the record by
the plaintiff:
The system of heating described in plaintiff's proposition, by
exhaust steam, is one not in common or general use. The terms
of the contract everywhere show that, so far as the defendant
was concerned, it was purely experimental. The plaintiff
promises not only good workmanship and material and sufficient heat, but in addition takes upon himself the burden of
making the system satisfactory in its results. 1811
Further, the defendant was able to establish some grounds for his dissatisfaction beyond mere caprice, particular problems he had with the
heat, or lack thereof, provided by the system.1lI8
The defendant might have been legitimately unhappy with the
weather conditions inside his mill, but the mill was being heated by
the plaintiff's apparatus, however imperfectly. If this was the case, was
there any justification for defendant's refusal to pay even one penny
for it? But it may not have been the case. The defendant's answer contained a demand for a set-off, referring to the plaintiff's agreement to
remove the work if it proved unsatisfactory and stated: "The defendant was obliged to take and remove said machine and appurtenances
at an expense of a large sum of money to wit $600 which said sum the
plaintiff owes the defendant."187 In an annexed account, the defendant
alleged that he had spent a total of $593.43 on removing the machines
from the building "and putting building in original condition."188 The
fact that exact figures were presented leads one to believe that the
work actually was removed. The plaintiff's demurrer to the set-off did
not deny that it was removed, only that "the demand set forth in said
declaration in set-off did not exist at the time of the commencement of
the above suit. m89 The set-off was never mentioned again.
If the defendant spent almost $600 to remove the work in an effort
to convince the court of the sincerity of his unhappiness with the system, it was money spent in vain. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld
135. Brief for Defendant at 1.
136. The defendant submitted evidence that "the thermometer may indicate a temperature of 70° Farenheit, and yet the system of heating, by reason of its variation, its
hot currents of air, & C., be far from satisfactory to the most reasonable of men." [d.
137. Defendant's Answer at 4.
138. Id.
139. Demurrer and Answer to Defendant's Declaration Set-Off at 1.
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the verdict for plaintiff, awarding him the full contract price plus interest. Holmes, in his opinion, did not so much attempt to distinguish the
prior cases dominating the field up until this time, as to pass over them
with a minimum of bother. After noting that agreements conditioned
on personal satisfaction are "usually" construed as requiring an honest
expression of dissatisfaction in order to make them enforceable contracts, he stated, "[i]n view of modern modes of business, it is not surprising that in some cases eager sellers or selling agents should be
found taking that degree of risk with unwilling purchasers, especially
where taste is involved. "140 He cited the familiar run of cases, including
Brown,lu Singerly,l42 and McClure Brothers.148 What Holmes wrote is
perfectly true. One can well imagine a young portrait painter, or a tailor new in town, agreeing to such a risky contract as the only way of
getting new customers to try out his services. Of course, the same
might be true for the manufacturer of a new "experimental" heating
system which he was trying to get mill owners to take a chance on.
Before proceeding any further with an examination of Holmes'
opinion, consideration should be given to some additional background
which may indicate his true motivation. Eight years before Hawkins
was decided, in The Common Law, Holmes discussed, and disagreed
with, what was then clearly the leading Massachusetts case on the subject, Brown v. Foster, the case of the ill-fitting three piece suit.l44 In his
discussion on voidable contracts he wrote:
[A] promise to pay for clothes if made to the customer's satisfaction, has been held in Massachusetts to make the promisor
his own final judge. So interpreted, it appears to me to be no
contract at all, until the promisor's satisfaction is expressed.
His promise is only to pay if he sees fit, and such a promise
cannot be made a contract because it cannot impose any obligation. IT the promise were construed to mean that the clothes
should be paid for provided they were such as ought to satisfy
the promisor, and thus to make the jury the arbiter, there
would be a contract, because the promisor gives up control over
the event, but it would be subject to a condition in the sense of
the present analysis. HIS
He plainly had no taste for the Brown result nor for the general rule of
which it had become a prime example. Now, sitting on the Supreme
Judicial Court, he was apparently in no position to overturn that case.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

149 Mass. at 287, 21.N.E. at 312.
113 Mass. 136 (1873). See notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
108 Pa. 291, 2 A. 230 (1885). See notes 82-87 and accompanying text supra.
58 Vt. 82, 2 A. 583 (1886). See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
113 Mass. 136 (1873).
O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 247 (1881 Howe ed. 1963).
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Nor would it make much sense for him to follow his line of reasoning
even if he could and hold that the arrangement between the parties
here, under which a large and complex heating system had already
been installed, was "no contract at all."
What Holmes could and did do with Brown and other cases like it
was to distinguish them away as quickly as possible and then move
on.146 He continued with a statement that was the seed from which the
new wisdom was to grow:
Still, when the consideration furnished is of such a nature that
its value will be lost to the plaintiff, either wholly or in great
part, unless paid for, a just hesitation must be felt, and clear
language required, before deciding that payment is left to the
will, or even to the idiosyncrasies, of the interested party. In
doubtful cases, courts have been inclined to construe agreements of this class as agreements to do the thing in such a way
as reasonably ought to satisfy the defendant. 147
Thus in one stroke Holmes not only enunciated the existence of two
tests, each equally respected and based on precedent, but established
that the objective test - the consideration of "what ought to satisfy
the defendant" - was the preferred one and was to be the result in
"doubtful cases." The fact is, of course, that the cases we reviewed,
decided just prior to Duplex, specifically criticized any attempt to introduce such an objective standard.148 The courts in those cases were
most definitely not, at least as they expressed it, performing the function of interpretation and choosing between two possibly valid ways of
reading such a contract. They were applying the test as they understood it.
The support that Holmes provided for his sweeping statement is
less than overwhelming. His suggestion that the courts had been hesitant to allow a seller or manufacturer to lose the entire value of goods
already delivered or services already performed has to be judged in
light of cases such as Zaleski v. Clark14t and Gibson v. Cranage. lIO It is
true that in those cases the purchasing party did not end up with possession of the goods contracted for, a portrait bust or painting of a
family member, respectively, but would this really matter to the artist?
Unless he could find another buyer for a bust of someone else's de146. 149 Mass. at 288-89, 21 N.E. at 313. See also text accompanying notes 140-43
supra.
147. Id., 21 N.E. at 313 (citing Sloan v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 141, 143 (1872); Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 1 B & S. 782, 799, 121 Eng. Rep. 904 (1861); Dallman
v. King, 4 Bing. N.C. 105, 132 Eng. Rep. 729 (1837».
148. See notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.
149. 44 Conn. 218 (1876). See notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
150. 39 Mich. 49 (1878). See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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ceased husband or a portrait of somebody else's child, the value of his
labor and materials would seem totally lost. If, instead, Holmes, meant
that the defendant buyer would be enriched at the plaintiff's expense if
allowed to keep the heating system without paying for it, then it must
be noted that this need not have been the result even if the defendant
avoided his obligation to pay on the contract. As reported by Holmes,
the plaintiff's offer clearly contemplated the possibility that if the
heating system was not as contracted for, and if the problems were not
remedied within ten days of written notice, the plaintiff could remove
the apparatus at his expense.151
If the defendant had not given the plaintiff proper notice of dissatisfaction, nor given the plaintiff a chance to remedy, he could be
charged with a lack of good faith and the plaintiff allowed recovery
without the infusion of a reasonableness standard.llli If the defendant
had acted in good faith and was still not satisfied, the plaintiff apparently would have had the right (indeed the responsibility) under the
contract to remove the system. If the defendant balked at this, his
honesty could have been questioned or he could have been made to pay
on a restitution theory. If the plaintiff did finally remove the system,
he would be left in the same position as the elevator company in
Singerly.llls In fact, it is arguable that he is better off than the rejected
artists in Zaleski and Gibson because the recovered apparatus is, at
least, partially reusable unlike the nearly valueless recovered materials
of the artists. As a matter of fact, we know what Holmes must have
known but what a reader of his opinion could not have been aware of
without reading the record on appeal lM - that the mill owner claimed
to have had the heating system removed from his building and the mill
restored to its original condition. In addition, he alleged he paid to
151. 149 Mass. at 286, 21 N.E. at 312. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
The offer specifically provided that "[in the event the system is not as contracted for] no
charge will be made on account of any of the aforementioned work; it being distinctly
understood the providing of the entire system is to be done at my own risk absolutely."
149 Mass. at 286, 21 N.E. at 313.
152. What would happen if the purchaser had claimed dissatisfaction and was willing
to give the seller the chance to remedy but did not specify any reason for his dissatisfaction? Does the seller really have an opportunity to remedy when all he knows is that the
buyer honestly does not like the performance but can find out no more? The buyer's
refusal to give any reason for his dissatisfaction, where a contract specifically gives the
seller the right to remedy within a specified period, might of itself constitute bad faith.
But is it really bad faith for someone to say of a portrait of himself or a loved one, "1
don't know why, but 1 just don't like it?" In any event, in Hawkins, (see notes 127-36
and accompanying text supra) there is no indication the seller did not have notice of the
fluctuating heat problem. The millowner did have his reasons; whether or not they were
"reasonable" is another matter.
153. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
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have this done. m Based on these facts, any concern over the defendant's enrichment rings fairly hollow.
Holmes cited three cases to support his assertion of "what courts
have been inclined to do" in "doubtful cases."lG8 The only American
case, Sloan v. Hayden,lG7 seems to be of questionable authority. Sloan
held that the language in dispute, while refering to the defendant's satisfaction did not create a condition on payment at all. Instead, it was
what is now called a time-fixing provision. lGS Even if this distinction
had not been clearly understood or appreciated at the time of Hawkins, Sloan would have been of doubtful authority. That opinion distinguishe'd an earlier and better-known Massachusetts case standing
for a strictly subjective standard, without discussion, by merely stating
that "the facts of that case differ so widely from those of the case at
bar that it is inapplicable."lGIl Even more telling is that Sloan, although
decided a year earlier, was not even mentioned in Brown,180 the leading
Massachusetts case in the field. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that Holmes came up with a rather limp example in his search for an
American case to bolster his contention.18l
The two English cases Holmes cited are probably worthy of
greater respect but neither stands squarely for the proposition he set
155. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
156. Sloan v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 141 (1872); Braunstein v. Accidental Ins. Co., 1 B. &
S. 782, 121 Eng. Rep. 904 (1861); Dallman v. King, 4 Bing, N.C. 105, 132 Eng. Rep. 729
(1837). .
157. 110 Mass. 141 (1872).
158. On this distinction in general, see discussion in connection with Duplex Safety
Boiler v. Garden 101 N.Y. 387, 4 N.E. 749 (1886), at notes 104-06 and accompanying text
supra.
159. 110 Mass. at 143 (distinguishing McCarren v. McNulty, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139
(1856».
160. 113 Mass. 136 (1873) discussed in notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
161. Plaintiff's Brief in Hawkins did not mention Sloan. The defendant referred to it
stating only that the instant case "is not within the reasoning" of Sloan, "but even if it
were, still the ruling that the satisfaction of the defendant was substantially eliminated
from the case would be more unjust to the defendant than the case would warrant."
Brief for Defendant at 2. Sloan does seem an. aberrational case, wedged as it is between
McCarren and Brown. Perhaps the result can best be understood by noting another case
which immediately preceeds it in the Massachusetts Reports. Gaffney v. Hayden, 110
Mass. 137 (1837). Gaffney was brought against the SaDIe employer as in Sloan, Hayden.
In addition, plaintiff's counsel was the SaDle in both cases, the trials were before the
SaDIe court and Judge Morton wrote both opinions for the Supreme Judicial Court. Both
cases appear to be the result of patently egregious attempts by the defendant employer
to avoid paying an employee what was due him. In Gaffney, the employer was claiming
that he owed the plaintiff, a minor, only $3.65 for two full months of work computed on
a piece work basis. Id. at 137. The court allowed the plaintiff to avoid the contract as a
minor and affirmed a judgment for $37.52 based on quantum meruit. Id. at 138. Sloan
and Gaffney may best be understood as a pair of cases which stand for the proposition
that the courts can countenance just so much outrageous behavior.
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forth. The first decision, Dallman v. King,162 held that a particular provision calling for the "approval" of the defendant could not be read as
a condition at all, thus virtually reading the provision out of the contract. Several judges commented that the provision, regardless of
whether it was a condition, could not be read to allow the defendant to
"capriciously withhold his approval."16S Nowhere, however, in any
opinion is there any indication that the decision required a reasonableness test beyond the test of good faith or honesty. In fact, the word
"reasonable" never appears in the decision.
In the second case, Braunstein v. Accidental Insurance CO.,164 the
justices did conclude that an insurance company which was required
by agreement to make payment when satisfactory proof of an accident
was received, had to act "reasonably" and not "capriciously."16s However, once again, there is nothing in this decision suggesting the holding means anything more than that the law would put some limitation
on the type of proof the insurance company could demand. The limitation could as well be one of good faith as of reasonableness. lee
162. 4 Bing. N.C. 105, 132 Eng. Rep. 729 (1837).
163. [d. at 109, 110, 112-13, 132 Eng. Rep. at 730, 731, 732.
164. 1 B. & S. 782, 121 Eng. Rep. 904 (1861).
165. [d. at 797,121 Eng. Rep. at 910.
166. See id. at 794, 795, 797, 799, 121 Eng. Rep. at 909,910. English courts have not
agreed with the approach taken by Holmes in his reading and use of Dallman and
Braunstein. See, e.g., Stadbard v. Lee, 3 B. & S. 364, 122 Eng. Rep. 138 (1863); Andrews
v. Belfield, 2 C.B. (N.S.) 779, 140 Eng. Rep. 622 (1857). To be fair it must be said that
today Dallman and Braunstein are taken as authority in England for an objective criterion similar to the American rule. 9 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 355 (4th ed. 1974).
An intriguing question is how Holmes became aware of these two English cases.
They were nowhere cited to the court by the plaintiff, though the contrary English case
of Andrews v. Belfield, supra, was noted on behalf of the defendant. Defendant's Brief at
3. I have found no reference to them in any American case prior to Hawkins. Holmes
probably was aware of the two cases through his familiarity with the Langdell case book
on contracts, first published in 1871 and the summary which Langdell prepared as an
appendix to the second edition in 1879. From the beginning, Braunstein was included in
the casebook. C. C. LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 827 (1871). The pertinent passage in the summary is as follows:
A condition which makes the payment of a debt dependent upon the will
and pleasure of the debtor is repugnant to the debt itself, and hence it
will either destroy the debt, or the condition itself will be void. [Citing
Dallman and the Pothier treatise]. Therefore, a proviso in a contract that
work shall not be paid for unless it be done to the satisfaction of the
employer, will be construed to mean, ut res magis valeat quam pereat,
["That it may rather become operative than null"], unless it be done to
his reasonable satisfaction. [Citing Dallman and Braunstein].
II C. C. LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACl'S 1006 (2d ed. 1879). It is worth
noting that the reason Langdell gives for requiring satisfaction, that it is necessary to
prevent the agreement from becoming a nullity, is the same justification given by
Holmes in The Common Law published in the next year, but abandoned by him for
another justification by the time of Hawkins.
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Our extended discussion and dissection of this crucial paragraph
in Hobnes' opinion has been justified by the pivotal role that it, to·
gether with the Duplex case, played in the introduction of an objective
test for cases of this kind into American law. While he actually went on
to affirm the judgment for the plaintiff on different grounds,187 and
while his own use of Hawkins in a case ten years later suggests no such
radical intention,lS8 Holmes had provided the language from which the
new wisdom was to grow.
·D. Professor Williston And The Spread Of The Objective Test
Within fifty years the innovation of the 1880's was to become the
accepted and established legal principle of the first Restatement of
Contracts. lS9 From the time of its adoption by the Restatement, the
167. He examined the language of the contract in detail and concluded, in effect, that
this was not strictly speaking a case involving a condition of personal satisfaction at all.
The last words, "or the work demonstrated," offer an alternative to the
owner's acknowledgment. They imply, that if the work is demonstrated
[to meet the contract specifications] it is satisfactory within the meaning
of the contract, although the owner has not acknowledged it. The previous
words, "and conforming with all requirements," tend the same way.
149 Mass. at 288, 21 N.E. at 313.
168. See Williams Mfg. Co. v. Standard Brass Co., 173 Mass. 356, 53 N.E. 862 (1899).
Williams involved a contract by the plaintiff to construct for the defendant equipment
to be used for melting brass, the installation to be paid for after a sixty-day trial period
if the equipment proved satisfactory to the defendant. HoImes specifically stated that
the jury's findings required the assumption that the work was done in accordance with
the specifications of the contract and in such a manner as to satisfy the reasonable man.
HoImes, in sustaining defendant's exceptions to judgment against it, stated:
We are of the opinion, also, with some slight hesitation on my part, that
the defendants' liability was conditioned as above suggested, and that
bona fide even if unreasonable dissatisfaction of the defendant is an answer to the plaintiff's claim. • • . [T]he contract does not provide a test
alternative to satisfaction, as was the case in Hawkins v. Graham •••
where the money was to be paid after acknowledgment of satisfaction by
the defendant "or the work demonstrated."
Id. at 360, 53 N.E. at 862-63. It now appears that what HoImes thought he was stating in
Hawkins (or at least what he claimed he meant to be stating) was merely that a court
should prefer the interpretation that no condition was intended when confronted with
ambiguous language, not that language which does clearly indicate a condition of this
type should be read as requiring only that which would satisfy a reasonable person for its
fulfillment.
Interestingly, in Williams Mfg. Co., he remarked that the equipment to be installed
"seems to have been regarded as more or less of an experiment, which facts confirm and
give a reason for the interpretation we adopt." ld., 53 N.E. at 863. I have previously
commented on HoImes' cavalier attitude towards a similar indication in the Hawkins
record. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. On this more limited reading of
Hawkins, see also Weinstein v. Miller, 249 Mass. 516, 144 N.E. 387 (1924).
169. In his introduction to the first Restatement of Contracts, William Draper Lewis,
Director of the American Law Institute, noted the expectation "that the Restatement of
this and other subjects will be accepted by the courts and the legal profession generally
as prima facie a correct statement of what may be termed the general common law of the
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place of an objective standard relative to personal satisfaction conditions would be unquestioned (or at least noncontroversial).l'lO It is not
possible to establish in precise fashion how the idea of an objective,
reasonable person test grew to be generally accepted over this period of
time. No single line of authority can be cited that will cover every jurisdiction. A review of materials covering these years, however, does
leave a distinct impression that while the idea certainly was picked up
by some courts following the Duplex and Hawkins decisions, its spread
was hardly that of an uncontrovertably brilliant (or necessary or modern) idea which could not be denied. Rather, it appears to represent
the popularization of an idea, and in that respect we encounter the
next major actor on the contracts scene, Professor Samuel W.
Williston.
Within three years of his appointment to the Harvard Law School
faculty, in 1890, Professor Williston took over the task of editing the
venerable treatise, The Law of Contracts,171 originally written by Theophilus Parsons. The seventh edition of that work, prepared "with additions by" William Kellen in 1883, discussing personal satisfaction
conditions, stated: "If A agrees to make something for B, to meet the
approval of B, or with any similar language, B may reject it for any
objection which is made in good faith and not merely capricious."17:1
Kellen then cited a familiar set of purely subjective cases.173 In the
eighth edition of the treatise, prepared by Williston in 1893, the
quoted text remained unchanged, but the central passage of Justice
Holmes' opinion in Hawkins v. Graham,174 had, been added to the footnotes,176 introduced by Williston's comment that "[t]he law on the
point is expressed with characteristic terseness and accuracy by
Holmes, J. in Hawkins v. Graham."176 He also included citations to the
two British cases relied upon by Holmes, as well as to a New York case
United States." RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, Introduction at xiv.
170. But see the discussion at note 198 infra, of the Pennsylvania cases.
171. Theophilus Parsons was the Dane Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School
from 1848 to 1870. In 1853 he first published his treatise on contracts with the help of
Langdell as a student assistant. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 107 n.16, 109 n.20
(1974). Williston was an assistant professor and professor at Harvard Law School from
1890 to 1938. A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 408 (1967).
172. 2 PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 62-63 (7th ed. Wm. V. Kellen ed. 1883)
[hereinafter Parsons (7th ed.»).
173. Kennen cited Brown, Gibson, and Zaleski, see notes 66, 74 & 78 and accompanying text supra, and the English case of Andrews v. Belfield, 2 C.B. (N.S.) 779, 140 Eng.
Rep. 622 (1857).2 PARSONS (7th ed.), supra note 172, at 62-63.
174. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889).
175. 2 PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 62-63 (8th ed. S. Williston ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as PARSONS (8th ed.»).
176. See the passage quoted at text accompanying note 147 supra.
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which followed the objectivist line. I '1'1
In another editorial assignment taken on by Williston, that of preparing the third edition of Wald's Pollack on Contracts in 1906, he
was no less bold in introducing the Hawkins v. Graham result as the
established doctrine of contract law.l'18 He also noted the Duplex decision, presenting it in such a way as to give the reader the (correct)
impression that it was an unusual and questionable result.l'1II Curiously,
he failed to make the same clear in his discussion of Hawkins.
Williston, apart from simply willing the Hawkins result and language into the body of "accepted" law, attempts to give that result
even greater respectability by critical comparison with Duplex. lso The
fact is that for most writers the two cases, although they arrive at their
results by very different routes, were noteworthy for what they had in
common, their introduction into the law of a whole new approach on
personal satisfaction contracts. lSI They were seen as a something of a
pair, which together produced a change in the law. But for Williston
their importance was in their difference. Hawkins, at least as he
presented it, was merely an articulation by Holmes that the courts are
often called upon to interpret ambiguous language chosen by the parties. What is so shocking about that? The fact is, of course, that until
only a few years prior to Hawkins, the courts had consistently viewed
such language as unambiguously meaning just what it stateS. IS2 Additionally, in The Common Law, Holmes had criticized the earlier established result, not on the grounds of questionable interpretation, but on
the lack of consideration.188 Neither of these facts was acknowledged
by Williston. ls4 The result is that Williston's presentation hardly permits the reader to appreciate, much less to be aware of, the significant
innovation that Hawkins undoubtably represented.
Williston, instead, tried to focus attention on what he saw as a
sharp distinction between this result, put in terms of simple contract
interpretation, and what he characterized the New York court as do177. PARSONS (8th ed.) supra note 175, at 62-63. The New York case of Doll v. Noble,
116 N.Y. 230, 22 N.E. 406 (1889), see note 126 supra, is cited. To those who understandably wonder why Williston did not take this opportunity to cite and promote Duplex, see
notes 185-87 and accompanying text infra.
178. Compare POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW ANn IN EQUITY 44 n.10 (2d
American ed. G. Wald ed. 1885) with POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY 51 n.59 (3d American ed. G. Wald and S. Williston eds. 1906).
179. His discussion of Duplex was that basically included later in his own treatise.
See text accompanying note 185 infra.
180. See notes 185-87 infra.
181. See note 188 and accompanying text infra.
182. See notes 66-91 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
184. For a discussion of the extent of Holmes' influence on Williston, see G. GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 113 n.39 (1974).
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ing-creating out of whole cloth an objective test, as a matter of positive law, of construction rather than interpretation. By the time of the
preparation of the first edition of his own treatise in 1920, he had made
his position perfectly clear. Mter setting forth the general requirement
of honest judgment and good faith dealing, he continued:
In New York and in some other States a broader and more

artificial meaning is given to such a promise. It is construed as
a matter of law as imposing upon the promisor the duty only of
satisfying a reasonable man, unless the subject-matter of the
contract involves personal taste. In such a case even in these
latter States the contract is held to require the actual satisfaction of the promisee. Frequently, no doubt, on a true construction [by which is presumably meant interpretation] of promises
for satisfactory performance, reasonable satisfaction and not
actual satisfaction of the promisee is all that is required. Especially is this likely to be the case where the contract provides
definite tests or specifications for the required performance,
and the satisfaction of one of the parties is not made the sole
determining factor.1811
This statement was further refined and strengthened in the 1936 revised edition of his work. He stated that the New York rule was "an
arbitrary refusal by the court to enforce the contract that the parties
made and seems unwarranted. "186 The correct view for him remained
simply one of deciding upon the "true interpretation" of such a
provision.187
During this same period, from Hawkins in 1889 to the First Restatement of 1932, other writers were not as ready as Professor Williston to admit the accepted principles of contract law included a consideration of what the promisor in such a situation "ought to have been
satisfied with," however such a test was understood or whenever it was
meant to be applied. 188 By the end of the 1920's it appeared that some
185. 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 44, at 76-77 (1920).
186. 3 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 675A,
at 1946-47 (rev. ed. 1936).
187. [d. at 1947. Two student commentaries dealing with the subject published in the
Harvard Law Review during Williston's tenure at that law school testify to his influence
as a professor. Both share his criticisms of the New York approach. 11 HARv. L. REv. 477
(1898); 20 HARv. L. REv. 558 (1907).
188. Several treatises of the period (primarily those whose editors were identified
with schools in the Northeast) were favorably inclined to the objective test. G. ARCHER,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 233 (1911) (G.L. Archer, Dean of the Suffolk School of Law);
C. AsHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 61(b) (1911) (C.D. Ashley, Professor and Dean of
New York University Law School); W. BRANTLEY, CONTRACTS § 144 (2d ed. 1912) (W.T.
Brantley, Reporter of the Maryland Court of Appeals, formerly Professor, University of
Maryland). But as often the writer would simply report the New York and Massachu-
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form of the objective test had spread to a few other states, including
California/so Illinois/90 and Rhode Island.l9l But it could hardly be
said to have gained any kind of national acceptance. Student comments of the period tended to characterize these jurisdictions as being
unusual or in the minority.192
This, then, was the situation at the time of the drafting and adoption of the original Restatement of Contracts. The section on this subject was undeniably the work of Williston. Appearing in none of the
earlier Restatement drafts, it was included only at the last moment
and adopted without discussion. 19s The section, as one might expect
from Williston, put the problem strictly in terms of interpretation of
language.
A promise in terms conditional on the promisor's satisfaction
with an agreed exchange, gives rise to no duty of immediate
performance until such satisfaction; but where it is doubtful
whether the words mean that a promise is conditional on the
setts type of result as a minority rule. 2 W. ELLIOTT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 1603-1605 (1913) (identified only as the co-author of several treatises); L.
HAMMON, CONTRACTS § 443 (1902) (unidentified); E. HARRIMAN, CONTRACTS § 283 (2d ed.
1901) (Professor of Law, Northwestern University); 5 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§§ 2618-2623 (2d ed. 1921) (W.H. Page, Professor of Law at University of Wisconsin); 13
C. J. CONTRACTS § 769, at 677 (1917). At least one author showed outright hostility to the
idea. J. LAWSON, CONTRACTS § 429 (3d ed. 1923) (J.D. Lawson, Professor of Law, University of Missouri). Professor Patterson in his article on the subject in 1921 accepted as the
prevailing American doctrine and personally supported a rule which rejects inquiry into
the question of reasonableness. Patterson, supra note 2, at 145-52. Although the article
suggested Patterson's agreement with the "Massachusetts rule," it interpreted the rule,
and in particular the case of Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6, 91 N.E. 155 (1910), as
requiring only honest satisfaction. Patterson, supra note 2, at 146.
189. See, e.g., Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 P. 105 (1921); JonesMcLaughlin, Inc. v. Kelley, 100 Cal. App. 315, 279 P. 1076 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
190. See, e.g., Union League Club v. Blymyer Ice Mach. Co., 204 Ill. 117, 68 N.E. 409
(1903).
191. See, e.g., Hanaford v. Stevens & Co., 39 R.I. 182, 98 A. 209 (1916); Pennington v.
Howland, 21 R.I. 65, 41 A. 891 (1898).
192. 22 ILL. L. REv. 780 (1928); 8 TEx. L. REv. 423 (1930); 77
PA. L. REV. 920
(1929). But see 14 MINN. L. REv. 87, 88 (1929) ("authority is divided").
193. Restatement § 265 made its first appearance in Proposed Final Draft No. 13
with the explanation that "[t]he point covered by the proposed new Section seems sufficiently important to justify its insertion." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 265, at 15 (Proposed Final Draft No. 13, 1932). This draft was primarily a "patch-up" document, making changes in previously discussed sections. Section 265 was then placed before the
A.L.I. meeting along with thirteen other sections where changes had been suggested by
Williston, who said he doubted there was anything in any of them to involve dispute.
"The reasons for them are explained and I doubt if any member of the Institute would
find reason to quarrel with any of them." When offered for discussion they received no
comments and the meeting moved on to other matters. 10 ALI PROCEEDINGS 173-74
(1931-1932).
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promisor's satisfaction with an agreed exchange, or on the sufficiency of that exchange to satisfy a reasonable man in the
promisor's position, the latter interpretation is adopted. 194
A single comment to the section offered nothing to explain or justify
this interpretational preference. 1911
The inclusion of this "reasonable man" test in the Restatement,
without any suggestion that it was other than the accepted law as the
drafters had found it, seems to have insured that it indeed would become the established rule. From that time, the possibility of an objective component to such conditions seems to have lost its controversial
nature. m Today, general authorities report it as a well established
194. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 265.
195. The only comment on the section reads:
A promise conditional upon the promisor's satisfaction is not illusory
since it means more than the validity of the performance is to depend on
the arbitrary choice of the promisor. His expression of dissatisfaction is
not conclusive. That may show only that he has become dissatisfied with
the contract; he must be dissatisfied with the performance, as a performance of the contract, and his dissatisfaction must be genuine.
[d. Comment a. Of the four offered illustrations, only the last in any way deals with an
objective test. It reads, "A promises to pay $1500 for a heating plant if on demonstration
the plant works satisfactorily. A's promise is interpreted as meaning that he will pay if
the plant would be satisfactory to a reasonable man in his position." [d. illustration 4.
Although not so identified, this illustration is clearly based on Hawkins; even the price is
within seventy-five dollars of the original. But notice as summarized the contract in the
illustration hinges only on the purchaser's satisfaction with the heating plant. The point
Holmes made central to his decision, the inclusion in the contract of a "test alternative
to satisfaction," see notes 167-68 supra, has been elinlinated. We are left to ponder
whether what we have seen is Williston's furthering of Holmes' idea and intent, or rather
a situation in which Williston has taken the single Holmes opinion for more than its
author would have anticipated and extended it to support his own ideas.
196. To say how a change in the law came about is not to say why. The reader by
now has the benefit of my research and my beliefs on the question, but I might add a
word on the evolution of those beliefs. It became apparent very quickly that Duplex and
Hawkins were the leading modem cases in the field by the tum of the century. See notes
92-168 and accompanying text supra. A reading of those opinions, compared to earlier
cases like Brown, may make it seem as if they were a perfectly predictable reaction to
the change in the times and the change in the type of cases coming before the courts.
Where satisfaction cases had once dealt with quirky situations of portraits being painted
and suits made to order, these two cases were evidently of a different type. Along with
the modernization of industry in the period came cases where the subject matter was a
major industrial item of a clearly commercial nature. What became apparent with further investigation, however, was that cases of this type had been coming to the courts
before and had given them no noticeable difficulty. See note 125 supra. Consideration of
the record in each of the cases also makes it much more questionable whether the particular result was necessitated by the actual situation presented. In each the equities seem
far more complex; certainly the older more conventional result could have been easily
justified by highlighting other aspects of the record.
I also note that in at least one major industrial state, Pennsylvania, the law has
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principle with the only remaining question being when not whether to
apply an objective test. 197 The change from the unquestioned case law
of the early 1880's had, through the influence of the Restatement, become complete. 19s
V.

THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTION

Even as the objective test for the fulfillment of conditions of personalsatisfaction was being introduced into the law, it was recognized
that it would not overtake the field completely. There were too many
instances, too many disappointing portraits and unacceptable tailoring
jobs, in which the courts insisted on each person's right to be judged of
his own satisfaction, to abolish or ignore the purely subjective standard
altogether. 199 The decisions in Duplex and Hawkins acknowledged
advanced without any apparent need or pressure to adopt an objective test. See note 198
infra. Finally, if we wish to consider the effect of economic forces, it might be argued
that in a period of rapid industrial change and improvements in technology the tradi·
tionallatitude given to buyers in satisfaction cases should have been strengthened. By so
doing the law would have given an additional bargaining chip to the technological inno·
vator who might have been able to market his wares to a skeptical public only by this
rather unconventional type of arrangement. I have no special knowledge on the subject,
but this appears to me to be what was happening in the 1880's with the producers of new
"experimental" types of boilers and elevator systems.
197. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, §§ 11·18; MURRAY, supra note 7, §
152.
198. To be perfectly accurate, the transformation to the objective test has not been
totally complete. Though it seems to have been overlooked by every authority, there is at
least one major jurisdiction which has never even hinted at a reliance on the objective
test. See Jenkins Towel Servo Inc. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 422 Pa. 601, 223 A.2d 84 (1966),
where the court stated:
Such contracts are not strangers to the law of Pennsylvania and have
been considered by us on numerous previous occasions. We have consist·
ently held that where a contract provides for performance by one party to
the satisfaction of the other, "the test of adequate performance is not
whether the person for whom the service was rendered ought to be satis·
fied, but whether he is satisfied, there being, however, this limitation, that
any dissatisfaction on his part be genuine and not prompted by caprice or
bad faith."
Id. at 606, 223 A.2d at 86 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania
cases are grounded on Singerly and include several other construction cases of the kind
that in most other jurisdictions would bring out the objective test in full force. Hood v.
Meininger, 377 Pa. 372, 105 A.2d 126 (1945); Brourman V. Bova, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 279,
182 A.2d 245 (1962); Solomon V. Ford, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 43, 164 A. 92 (1933). For more
recent cases, see Aster V. BP Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Canonsburg
Supply & Equip. CO. V. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 388 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Publicker Int'l Inc., 303 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In at
least two other jurisdictions, Connecticut and West Virginia, no cases have been found
by the author which accept the idea of an objective standard.
199. See, e.g., Brown V. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873); Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49
(1878). See notes 66·73, & 78 and accompanying text supra.
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these earlier subjective cases and did not criticize, at least explicitly,
any of them. The earlier cases were not wrong, but rather were distinguishable. The puzzle then became when each test was to be used, and
how the two could exist in·harmony, each finding a place in the scheme
of things.
Initially, we might expect that the question would be primarily addressed, and in most instances satisfactorily resolved, by careful examination of the particular circumstances in Which the word "satisfaction"
has been used and by the exact language of the contract in. dispute.
Unfortunately, anyone surveying the cases, even the reader not normally possessing a great deal of cynicism, will quickly come to the conclusion that just about the last thing that anyone seems concerned
with is exactly what the parties said or wrote. Though it is normally
asserted by the courts and other writers that the question is only one
of contract interpretation and that the parties can agree to whichever
test they wish "by clear language,"200 such statements are usually mere
asides as the court imposes its judgment on the parties. It is not unusual to see the court stressing the language used by the parties provided it reinforces the result which the court has reached. Nor is it
unusual to find a decision ignoring what seems to be clear and unequivocallanguage which fails to suit the court's conclusion.201
What quickly became true in most jurisdictions, along with the
recognition of an objective test, was that the selection in a particular
instance of the appropriate standard was to be dominated by a distinction made between cases based on the "subject matter" of the contract.
The classic statement of this distinction would have all contracts fit
into one of two categories: the first, consisting of contracts "relating to
personal taste or fancy;" the second covering all contracts where the
subject matter of the agreement is open to judgment on the basis of
mechanical fitness, utility or merchantability.202 Under this scheme,
200. See, e.g., 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 644, at 80; 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, §
675A, at 207.

201. See, e.g., Shimek v. Vogel, 105 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1960). One distinction which
we might initially expect to be of importance is that between contracts which are conditioned on a thing being "satisfactory" or working in a "satisfactory" manner, with no
reference to a particular person, and those contracts expressly providing for satisfaction
of the buyer. A few cases do focus on this difference, Lockwood Mfg. Co. v. Mason Regulator Co., 183 Mass. 25, 66 N.E. 420 (1903); Glyn v. Miner, 6 Misc. 637, 27 N.Y.S. 341
(1894), but others affirmatively state that a contract calling for something like "satisfactory quality" actually contemplates satisfaction of the particular buyer. Camp ell Printing-Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 F. 414, 418 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888); Devoine Co. v. International Co., 151 Md. 690, 693, 136 A. 37, 38 (1927); Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N.J.L. 419,
420, 103 A. 23, 23 (1918). In general, this distinction, like all other subtleties of language,
seems to have been quickly overwhelmed by the use of the subject matter distinction to
be discussed.
202. American Oil Co. v. Carey, 246 F. Supp. 773 (E.D.Mich. 1965); Isbell v. Ander-
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the subjective honesty test is to apply to (or at least be preferred for)
cases in the first category and the objective test is to apply to cases in
the second category.203
Initially, we might point out that this fundamental division of all
contracts into two groups does not appear to make much sense. It is
difficult to see the distinction. Even if we were to concede that certain
contracts seem to fall naturally into the first category, such as agreements for portraits to be painted, or performance by musicians or for
valet services,2M in another context we might not think twice about
considering questions of "reasonably competent performance" or "performance up to the standard of the trade" in judging such things.205
On the other hand, consider an instance which Corbin suggests
son Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding
Corp., 10 A.D.2d 447,200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1960); Western Hills, Oregon Ltd. v.
Pfau, 265 Or. 137, 508 P.2d 201 (1973). Williston divides all agreements into three categories: "(1) Contracts of employment, (2) Contracts involving matters of personal taste,
sensibility, judgment, or convenience, and (3) Contracts in which there is a requirement
of satisfaction as to mechanical fitness, utility, or marketability." 5 WILLISTON, supra
note 4, § 675A, at 191-92. Most authorities, rather than making employment contracts a
separate category, would include them in the personal taste and fancy class. See, e.g.,
CALAMARI & PERILLO supra note 7, §§ 11-18, at 402. Far more interesting is that Williston skewed the question for his third category in the way that he phrased it. This class is
not usually defined as one where there is a well articulated condition of satisfaction "as
to" something like mechanical fitness. This would read something like "provided I am
satisfied that it meets the standard of marketability," or "provided I am satisfied it is at
least 98% pure." Rather this class is usually seen as being those contracts containing a
general condition of satisfaction ("provided I am satisfied with it") where the court decides the subject matter is the kind of thing which is usually judged by others in an
"objective" way.
Of course, this classification scheme has not been adopted in a state like Pennsylvania which has never recognized the objective test. See note 198 supra.
203. CALAMARI & PERILLO supra note 7, §§ 11-18, at 402. In most states the distinction is said only to articulate an interpretational preference. See, e.g., Kadner v. Shields,
20 Cal. App. 3d 251, 97 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1971); Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper
Co., 202 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1953). In New York, the application of the distinction is still
undertaken as a matter of law. Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 A.D.2d 447,
200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1960). As a practical matter the cases using the preference
may place such a great emphasis on this distinction that there may be little real difference between the two approaches.
204. The first two examples are from REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228,
illustrations 4 & 5, following Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878), and Ferris v. Polansky, 191 Md. 79, 59 A.2d 749 (1948), respectively. The third is from Fursmidt v. Hotel
Abbey Holding Corp., 10 A.D.2d 447, 200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1960).
205. Consider a painter who is to paint a portrait where the contract contains no
satisfaction clause. Can he collect his fee if he delivers a signed canvas which is otherwise
blank or bearing only one large splotch of color? Does it really matter that the artist
honestly believes he has captured the essence of his subject? No matter how far we wish
to stretch artistic license, certainly some standards must apply. See, e.g., McCrady v.
Roy, 85 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 1956).
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would "easily" be placed in the second category of contracts, delivery
of a "standard motor car."206 What are we to think about ourselves for
having wasted so much time in the past agonizing over the various
available "standard" colors or interiors? Even on such clearly
"mechanical" matters as engine performance or steering, we know that
some people will be concerned only with whether the car meets their
own understanding of the appropriate mechanical standards as these
things show up on sophisticated testing devices. Others of us could not
care about such things; for us the question is whether we like the ride
or the feel. Isn't it evident that the choice of our more "objectively"
minded friends to concern themselves solely with questions of mechanical fitness and numerical standards is in itself a choice reflective of
their personal taste or fancy?
Even if we were to suspend our disbelief (or rather simple common
sense) for a moment and admit to the possibility that this articulated
distinction is a workable one, it would be hard to make much sense of
the way in which the courts have applied it to certain classes of contracts in the past. Thus, employment contracts are usually seen as requiring only the subjective test, and this would seem to be so whether
or not the employment is one involving a measure of truly personalized
service.207 Contracts for the sales of goods also tend to be classed as
those requiring only a subjective determination of satisfaction,208 even
when the cases involve farm implements,209 heating and ventilation
equipment,210 and industrial equipment and machinery.211 On the
other hand, the great majority of cases involving construction contracts
appear to rely on the objective standard.21S While the majority of these
decisions can probably be understood and perhaps justified on other
206. 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 646, at 94. Corbin, in a later hypothetical involving a
car, makes a contrary suggestion that only honest dissatisfaction should be required. ld.
§ 647, at 103-04.
207. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, §§ 11-18, at 402; 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4,
§ 675, at 193-96. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1497 (1920). At one point Corbin asserts,
that "with respect to contracts for most kinds of personal service, the community standard of efficiency and 'satisfactoriness' will contro!." 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, at 95-96.
He offers little support for this, only two Rhode Island cases of 1916, and it must be seen
as unsupported by most of the later cases.
208. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 200 (1968). The Uniform Commercial Code
ducks the issue entirely. "On the point of 'satisfaction' as meaning 'reasonable satisfaction' where an industrial machine is involved this Article takes no position." U.C.C. § 2326, Comment 1. See Note, 42 U. P1'IT. L. REV. 375 (1981).
209. Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 200, § 17.
210. ld. § 21.
211. ld. § 23.
212. See generally 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 646, at 98; Annot., 44 A.L.R. 1114
(1955).
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grounds,213 it is hard to see, for example, how the performance of a
workman in his employment is to be characterized as involving matters
of taste and fancy while that which he creates or constructs is not. The
construction of a building, involving not only quality of workmanship
but also the appearance of the structure and use of materials often
chosen solely for aesthetic reasons, would seem to be a situation where
"personal taste and fancy" would be appropriate.
The cases are even more difficult to follow when it is observed that
courts apply the distinction based on the "subject matter of the contract," such as bricks or buildings or boilers, with little or no regard to
the larger context of the agreement. In New York, for example, the
subjective test began to be chosen over the objective standard in cases
in which a single article of clothing was to be made for the purchaser's
personal use214 or the contract was for the employment of someone to
design or supervise the production of clothing.21II The authority of
these decisions was then mechanically applied to a case where a garment manufacturer had entered into an agreement to make a large
number of garments over a period of one and one-half years.S18 While
the opinion in Seitless v. Goldstein,217 provides few details, apparently
a large commercial venture was involved rather than the production of
a single pair of pants. Without discussing whether, in this particular
situation, a standard of merchantibility or similar "objective" criteria
could apply (and it seems hard to argue it would not), the court, relying on the earlier decisions, held the subjective test alone should apply.
Clothing is, after all, clothing. Another well-known New York case,
Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp.,'18 would seem to be uncontroversial in applying the subjective test to a contract described as being for valet services, but descriptions can be deceiving. The defendant
in the case was, in reality, not an example of the now rare person
blessed with the wealth necessary to employ a private servant. The defendant was a corporation owning a hotel. The plaintiff and his father,
under the agreement, had contracted for the hotel's valet and laundry
213. See the discussion of the influence on these decisions of the concern for forfeiture at notes 256-59 and accompanying text infra.
214. Schwartz v. Cohn, 129 N.Y.S. 464 (App. Term 1911); Haehnel v. Tr08tler, 54
Misc. 262, 104 N.Y.S. 533 (App. Term 1907).
215. Diamond v. Mendelsohn, 156 A.D. 636, 141 N.Y.S. 775 (1st Dep't 1913); Ginsberg v. Friedman, 146 A.D. 779, 131 N.Y.S. 517 (1st Dep't 1911); Snyder v. Greenhut &
Co., 71 Misc. 117, 127 N.Y.S. 1068 (App. Term 1911).
216. Seitless v. Goldstein, 164 N.Y.S. 682 (App. Term 1917).
217. ld.
218. 10 A.D.2d 447, 200 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1960). It is arguable that this problem of knee-jerk classification is more pronounced in New York because the Duplex approach, which calls for the court to determine as a matter of law the test to be applied, is
still followed. See note 203 supra.
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concession.219 Because this was a fairly large commercial deal, it would
seem perfectly feasible for the court to have addressed the question of
whether the service provided to the guests was such as would normally
meet industry standards, even considering the high class of the particular hotel. It is just the kind of question which can be and is regularly
considered at trial. 220
I am not contending that the application of the purely subjective
test would necessarily be wrong in cases where the contract was formed
in a commercial setting. Rather, it is evident that if the subjective test
is to be applied in some cases, but not in others, this decision cannot
be justified because in these particular cases the nature of the "subject
matter" is such that the application of an objective type of test is a
219. 10 A.D.2d at 448, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
220. The reasoning of the opinion deserves closer attention. The court first noted:
This agreement provided that the defendant was to exercise strict control
and direction of almost every aspect of the plaintiff's operation. The
prices were to be fixed by the defendant; disputes with the hotel guests
were to be finally resolved by the defendant; the specific hours of service
were to be established by the defendant "to conform to the convenience of
its guests"; the plaintiff's employees had to be approved by the defendant
as were their uniforms; and all the billing was to be done through the
defendant as though it were rendering the services to the guests.
Id. at 450, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 259. The court argued this language demonstrated that the
performance called for was "much removed" from things normally measurable by objective standards. Id., 200 N.Y.S.2d at 259. But does this follow? It could be argued that the
fact that the defendant had retained so much control and in such detail demonstrates
objective standards are available. H the valet service did not charge the prices the defendant set, or did not stay open the prescribed hours, and so forth, then the defendant
would have had clear-cut reasons to terminate the relationship. As Holmes might have
put it, the contract offers specifications as "an alternative to satisfaction." See note 168 supra. The opinion also stated:
In this case the defendant did not bargain for a particualr type of
pressing,stitching or laundering but rather for a relationship between the
plaintiff's organization and the hotel's guests as would protect and enhance the good will so essential to the operation of the hotel business. No
objective standards of reasonableness can be set up by which the effectiveness of the plaintiff's performance in achieving the effect sought can
be measured.
10 A.D.2d at 450,200 N.Y.S.2d at 260. Does the court really believe that if the contract
had contained the plaintiff's agreement to use "best efforts" to enhance the good will of
the hotel instead of a satisfaction clause, an action brought on this latter provision would
be impossible of determination?
As will be emphasized in the text, I am not necessarily arguing that the result in
Fursmidt, allowing the defendant's good faith determination to control, is wrong, but
only that these arguments advanced for it are all slightly questionable. The best argument that can be made for a subjective test here is that the contract means exactly what
it says. "[I]t is distinctly understood and agreed that the services to be rendered by the
second party [plaintiff] shall meet with the approval of the first party [defendant], who
shall be the sole judge of the sufficiency and propriety of the services." Id. at 448, 200
N.Y.S.2d at 258.
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realistic impossibility. We may want to rely upon the purely subjective
test in many instances, for reasons we mayor may not be conscious of,
but it is not something that we are compelled to do by the
circumstances.
VI. THE

RESTATEMENT SECOND, PREFERRED INTERPRETATION,
THE CONCERN .ABOUT FORFEITURE

ANn

The difficulty with a test narrowly based on the subject matter of
the contract, and which ignores other aspects of the contract relationship, may be the reason why the drafters of the Restatement Second of
Contracts, have taken a somewhat different tack than the original Restatement.221 The Restatement Second establishes a distinction based
not on the subject matter of the contract but on whether "it is practicable" to apply an objective criterion in the particular case.
When it is a condition of an obligor's duty that he be satisfied
with respect to the obligee's performance or with respect to
something else, and it is practicable to determine whether a
reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be satisfied, an interpretation is preferred under which the condition
occurs if such a reasonable person in the position of the obligor
would be satisfied.222
Unfortunately, the drafters provide no assistance in determining how
the issue of practicability should be addressed. In three illustrations
the drafters inform us that it is "practicable to apply an objective test"
to the installation of a heating system in a factory,22S but not to the
painting of a portrait of the purchaser's daughterU or to the employment of a four-piece musical ensemble.22Ii This sounds like the subject
221. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 265. See also notes 193-95 and accompanying text
supra.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228.
223. ld. Comment b, illustration 3 (based on Hawkins V" Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21
N.E. 312 (1889».
224. ld. illustration 4 (based on Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878».
225. ld. illustration 5 (based on Ferris v. Polansky, 191 Md. 79, 59 A.2d 749 (1948».
This last illustration should be examined more fully. It provides:
A contracts to have B furnish a four-piece band to play in A's inn for
six months, with a provision, "If band proves unsatisfactory to A contract
is subject to two weeks' notice." A occasionally objects when B is absent
and a guitar is substituted for B's string bass. Mter two months, A gives
notice of termination, stating that he is dissatisfied for this reason. B has
no claim against A since it is not practicable to apply an objective test to
the band's performance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228. In a way this is very similar to Fursmidt.
Perhaps, as was argued with respect to that case, it is not truly "impracticable" to apply
an objective test here. Could that be why the drafters have included in this illustration,
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matter distinction all over again. 2l18
The Comments to this Restatement Second section go well beyond
the original Restatement and offer something new in discussing and
seeking to justify the rule the section adopts. The portion of the original Restatement on the topic,lI27 presumably the work of Williston,2l18
established the objective test as the preferred interpretation in doubtful cases, but without any explanation. The Restatement Second, also
stating that this is a matter of contract interpretation and that the
objective test is preferred,229 attempts to justify this as the rule. This
brings us to the question introduced much earlier. What reason can
there be for the articulation and imposition of a so-called objective test
in any such situation, and further, why should it be the preferred test
in the general run of the cases? It is not unreasonable to ask for some
kind of principled justification. Any legal rule is open to this challenge,
and it would seem particularly true of one which is sometimes characterized (even by its proponents) as requiring that a person, even one
operating in good faith, "ought to be satisfied" with something with
which he is not.
The drafters of the Restatement Second have given great weight
to this preference. At times they appear to regard the application of
the honesty test alone to other than the most clear-cut (and relatively
minor) cases as a failure of the legal system. Thus, the comment:
If . . . the circumstance with respect to which a party is to be

satisfied is such that the application of an objective test is impracticable, the rule of this Section is not applicable. A court
will then, for practical reasons, apply a subjective test of honest satisfaction, even if the agreement admits of doubt on the
point and even if the result will be to increase the obligee's risk
of forfeiture. 28o
Are "practical reasons" the only justification that would suggest the
conditional promisor's honesty should be the measure? Certainly up
until one hundred years ago the courts thought otherwise; their adherunlike in the previous portrait painting example, (see note 224 and accompanying text
supra) the reason for the party's dissatisfaction, a reason that is fairly "reasonable" to
me?
226. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
227. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 265.
228. See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228. The actual text and language beginning the comments state only that the Second Restatement establishes a special standard of preference. Id. It is arguable that the drafters have practically given it the force
of a rule of law. Note, for example, their later use of the term, "the rule of this section."
Id. Comment b. In context it practically reads as equivalent to "use of the objective
test."
230. Id. Comment b.
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ence to and belief in the purely subjective test was expressed in a decidedly affirmative way, as that best in keeping with the very nature of
the bargain the parties had made for themselves.2S1 They adhered to
the subjective test alone because of a belief that it was fair whatever
the consequences of a particular case and not because it was unavoidable under the circumstances.232
In trying to understand how this attitude might have changed, it is
tempting to view the transformation as the courts' response to glaring
examples of unfairness, particularly in the seminal cases of Duplex and
Hawkins. A reading of the appellate opinions in those two cases makes
such a conclusion an inviting one. But the decisions preceding the two
landmark decisions288 and the records of the two cases on appeals·"
make this far less certain. At the very least it could be said that they
are not that different from other cases of the period which found no
difficulty relying on the old rule. Nor was the situation in either of
them, based on an examination of the records before the court, one
that cried out for a fundamental reversal of the law to prevent gross
injustice.285
To the extent that the new rule gained validity as a rule of substantive law in the New York mold, through Duplex following Folliard
(which itself borrowed from the civil law) ,:188 it is hard to see any consistent philosophy or rationale behind it. To the apparently greater extent t:bat the preference for the objective standard was a result of the
efforts of Williston making use of Holmes' groundwork in Hawkins,la7
the rule is explained and justified in the simplest of terms. It is merely
a matter of doing a good job in contract interpretation. No new wisdom
is being propounded. An objective test is used because in the particular
situation it is what the parties themselves had considered, understood
and agreed upon.288
This type of rationale, that the law imposes nothing on the parties
by applying an objective test but only gives them what they intended,
is still prominent in the most recent edition of Williston:lllll as well as in
231. See notes 66-91 and accompanying text supra.
232. In particular, recall the language of the courts in Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Town of
Chico, 24 F. 893 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885); Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873) and Singerly
v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291, 2 A. 230 (1885) as discussed in text accompanying notes 73, 81 &
87 supra.
233. See, e.g., notes 66-91 and accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 96-100 & 135-39 and accompanying text supra.
235. Id.
236. 2 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1807). See notes 108-10 and accompanying text supra.
237. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889). See note 188 and accompanying tex~ supra.
238. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
239. 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 675A.
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the Corbin treatise. 240 It even serves as a justification for the subject
matter distinction as that rule is usually expressed. Thus Corbin states:
When A promises to do certain work involving artistic
taste or personal fancy "to B's personal satisfaction," it may be
this state of mind that is B's chief object of desire, a fact that
A has reason to know because it would be the chief object of
desire on the part of men in general . . . . According to standards of men in general B ought not to be compelled to pay
without being personally satisfied.
Where the performance contracted for is one that involves
operative fitness and mechanical utility rather than personal
taste and fancy, the personal satisfaction of the promisor is
much less likely to be regarded by the average man as his chief
object of desire. There can be substantial performance in accordance with generally held opinion even though the promisor
thinks otherwise. The extent and quality of the performance
rendered can be measured by objective tests, scientific and
mechanical in character, that have uniform application for all
persons alike. In these cases, the fact that A promises expressly
240. 3A CORBIN, supra note 4, § 646. Corbin, in fact, uses the example of a case involving such a condition to illustrate the distinction he makes between what he calls
interpretation and construction. [d. § 534, at 13-15. In an earlier article, he had adopted
without criticism both the objective test and the subject matter distinction. Unlike the
treatise, however, which emphasized the probable meaning the parties intended for the
language (see text accompanying note 241 infra) the article stressed the concerns of socalled forfeiture and enrichment:
The decision will depend in part on whether the plaintiff will suffer a
heavy loss or the defendant receive unjust enrichment in case personal
satisfaction is held to be a condition. An increasing liberality is to be
noted in allowing a quasi-contractual recovery by a plaintiff in default,
but this is available only where the defendant has received value and not
where the plaintiff will merely suffer a heavy loss. In a sale of goods upon
a contract that the goods may be returned if not satisfactory to the buyer,
personal satisfaction is clearly a condition if the article is one involving
personal taste. It is also usually held that if the contract makes the buyer
the sole judge he may return the articles even if they do not involve
strictly a matter of personal taste, at least in all cases where he can place
the seller in statu quo. When the consideration furnished is'of such a nature that its value will be largely or wholly lost to the one furnishing it
unless paid for, and it is not a matter that ordinarily involves merely personal taste, the courts are strongly inclined to hold that the satisfaction of
a reasonable man is the only condition. But if the plaintiff's work and
material are to result in something involving personal taste or comfort the
genuine dissatisfaction of the promisor will defeat a recovery.
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 762-63 (1919), reprinted
in AALS, SELECTED READINGS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 871, 892 (1931) (footnotes
omitted).
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to complete the performance entirely to B's satisfaction is not
enough to make B's personal satisfaction a condition of his
duty to pay. A renders substantial performance, and B will be

compelled to pay, if application of the objective tests shows
that reasonable men would be satisfied and that B has received
substantially what he bargained for. 241
Corbin's assumption, in the second paragraph, about human nature, that when parties are dealing in a contract with things measurable by objective standards they probably intended these standards to
be applied, raises serious questions. If this is indeed the case, why did
the parties include the satisfaction clause to begin with? If Corbin's B
is compelled to pay when he "has received substantially what he bargained for," what is the clause other than a meaningless appendage to
an otherwise perfectly complete and acceptable agreement? It is at
least arguable that a contract dealing with such things as are traditionally thought to be subject to easy evaluation under objective type tests
is just the contract where we should be most hesitant to assume the
parties did not intend honest judgment of satisfaction alone to govern.
Why would they have adopted the very unusual, untraditional satisfaction clause for their agreement if they intended B's obligation to come
about upon substantial performance "in accordance with generally held
opinion?" That is the same result they would have had if they had not
included the satisfaction clause and left themselves to be governed by
the usual doctrines of substantial performance, merchantibility, and so
forth.242
It may be that in many contracts a condition of satisfaction means
little in actuality - it may be mere boilerplate language or meant by
both parties only as some nebulous promise of superior quality. But
should we presume this to be so? This question itself leads to two
others. First, is it not possible that the parties included such a clause
so that B can be assured of a performance beyond that which generally
constitutes substantial performance in like circumstances, but that he
never expected the agreement to go to the point where his unfettered
241. 3A CORBIN supra note 4, § 646, at 93-94. See also 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, §
675A, at 206.
242. A good illustration of this point is the case of a contract for the sale of land
where the vendor promises to provide "title satisfactory to the purchaser." Questions of
what title a reasonable buyer would or must take are normally dealt with under the
rubric of marketable title. See, e.g., Cumming v. Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1954).
Corbin's rationale might lead us to conclude that since the parties know such a "uniform
objective" test existed, they must have intended to apply it to their case. But why did
they add the very uncoventional satisfaction language when all they intended was the
very traditional marketability result which they would have had without such language?
Perhaps this accounts for the fact that the cases are evenly split on this particular question with no indication of a consensus forming. See Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 455 (1956).
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opinion, albeit honestly held, would totally control? B may have, in
effect, bargained for a performance to meet his particular standards of
perfection, quite above that which the reasonable person (even the reasonable person in B's position) would ask for or even notice. Some
standard quite apart from either mere honesty or full-fledged reasonableness may have been what was intended.us
A second question that might be asked is, if such a clause is
viewed as mere boilerplate or fuzzy language, whose boilerplate or
fuzzy language is it? Virtually all of the writers on the subject avoid
any discussion of how and by whom the satisfaction language was first
introduced into the relationship. Instead, they rely on the fiction that
the language was arrived at by both parties acting together in some
kind of joint drafting exercise. Those writers who do deal with this
aspect of the problem appear, if anything, to offer us an image of the
party in B's position, the conditional obligor, being the one who forced
the language on the unwitting A and is now more than willing to selfishly take advantage of it. This is the tone taken by a comment to the
Restatement Second, which after noting the "selfish interests" of the
obligor, concludes that if he "would subject the obligee's right to compensation to his own idiosyncrasies, he must use clear language."244 I
can well understand the drafters' concern for the interests of A in this
situation. We could not be very happy forcing on him a bargain that he
did not think he had made. But I submit the problem comes out looking very different if we consider B's position. It might be better to
state that if the obligee, A, would subject the obligor, B, to the duty to
pay for something with which he is not truly satisfied, then A must use
clear language or in some other manner let B know that in this in243. B might even wish to bargain for very "objective" sounding results which no
reasonable man would care about but which are still capable of determination with
mathematical precision. Suppose, for example, he contracts to have a pin stripe suit
made to order and to his satisfaction and makes it clear to A that this satisfaction clause
is required because he is only satisfied with such suits when they have an even number of
stripes running down each leg. If this is not the result he should not have to accept the
suit, however unreasonable this may seem. If however, he finds himself dissatisfied, even
honestly dissatisfied, with the suit because he has changed his beliefs and now wants
only odd numbers surrounding him, we might feel this should not justify his rejecting
the suit. The point is that many demands of individual taste, fancy or whim can be
expressed in perfectly concrete measurable terms. If these are clearly understood by both
parties, presumably that measure, which is neither a general "reasonable person" standard nor a totally subjective one, should apply.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment b. Remember that according to comment a to the same section, the terms "satisfaction" and "complete satisfaction" are definitely not clear enough for this purpose. [d. Comment a. So A is happy,
B is not. Whatever we may think of this crass, pushy (idiosyncratic!) character B, I'd
hate to think where the law of contracts would be today without one person being willing
to advance his own "selfish interests" over those of another.
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stance the word "satisfaction" means something other than the usual
meaning of the word B probably learned at a tender age.
The Restatement Second's bias against the obligor reflects, consciously or not, the presumption that the obligor, since it is he who
may take advantage of the clause, must have originally introduced it
into the agreement. But this presumption may not ring true if we recall
all those late night television advertisements offering everything from
vegetable slicers to collections of favorite Christmas melodies, each
trumpeting the fact that we need pay "only if fully satisfied." Even in
the full light of day, perfectly reputable manufacturers may go out of
their way to advertise "Satisfaction Guaranteed" for the very purpose
of inducing people, who might not otherwise do so, to deal with them.
Imagine how you would feel if you tried to return the vegetable slicer,
but were unsuccessful because it was a mechanical device which had
been highly praised by every other buyer, all reasonable people.lI4D By
focusing for the moment on the instance of the slicing and dicing machine, I do not mean to minimize the seriousness of this point. In many
of the cases considered thus far, it might be reasonably assumed without knowing more, that the satisfaction clause was offered initially by
the seller of the goods or services involved with the clear purpose, and
perfectly honorable purpose, of attracting a dubious customer. Certainly this would appear true in the portrait painting type of case.
What is more surprising is that our examination of the available
records in Duplex1l48 and Hawkins ll47 makes it seem likely in those
cases as' well. 24s
245. It's after making a statement such as this that an author is tempted simply to
rest his case. If you ever do run into this problem you might get some help from the fact
that contracts for the sale of goods are usually placed in the personal taste and fancy
category nQ matter what the actual nature of the goods involved. See note 208 supra.
The fact that few of the reported cases actually deal with the classic consumer context, in which we seem to see "Satisfaction Guaranteed" langauge so often, may be an
indication of how rarely consumers are dissatisfied in our society. More likely it is a
reflection of the expense of bringing even the simplest law suit. It was recently reported
that the Federal Trade Commission had undertaken an investigation of the "Satisfaction
Guaranteed" claims made by the nation's largest retailers, including Sears Roebuck &
Co., the F.W. Woolworth Company, Montgomery Ward & Co. and Korvettes. N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1980, §D, at 4, coL I.
246. See notes 92-126 and accompanying text supra for discussion of Duplex.
247. See notes 127-68 and accompanying text supra.
248. Recall that in Duplex, testimony given by both sides indicated that the building
owners had been sufficiently dissatisfied with the boilers to want them removed. However, a repair agreement had been entered into in order to preserve the reputation of the
boiler company's products. See text accompanying notes 96 & 97 supra. In Hawkins, the
defendant's brief claimed that the heating system to be installed was "purely experimental," thereby suggesting that he was induced to try it because of the protection offered
him by the satisfaction clause. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. The language
of the contract in Hawkins was that drafted by the plaintiff-seller for his offer. 149 Mass.
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To be sure, all authorities, including Corbin, agree that the obligor
"by apt and convincing language" may make honest dissatisfaction and
nothing more'the rule of the contract.lI" A Restatement Second comment states that this will result when "the agreement leaves no doubt
that it is only honest satisfaction that is meant and no more."lIGO The
illustrations to this section suggest that the distinction is between language like "satisfactory to the buyer," which will not do the trick, and
"satisfactory in the buyer's honest judgment," which will.lIlil Is this the
type of distinction which we can reasonably expect a typical buyer to
be aware of? It is difficult to imagine that even the most alert purchaser would realize he should bargain for a change in the language if
he is to get the protection he expects, particularly where the "Pay No
Money If Not Completely Satisfied" style of provision has been offered
by a seller to induce the sale.
What these questions demonstrate is that the use of, and preference for, the objective test cannot be justified as simply a result of the
process of interpretation applied neutrally. Something more is obviously going on here. Some policy consideration, explicit or otherwise, is
behind many of the decisions and the rule as generally articulated.
This concern is generally and loosely termed forfeiture. The possibility
that one party may have performed all or substantially all of what he
at least believed he was to do and yet receive not a penny in retum
gives strong impetus to a court to avoid such a result if it can. Often
the problem of so-called forfeiture is seen in tandem with what will be
termed unjust enrichment or simply enrichment of the other party,
though this need not always be so. A portrait painter, for example,
whose work does not satisfy and hence is not accepted, may be thought
to suffer a forfeiture if the portrait has not even scrap value. He has
even lost the value of the materials used. But there is no enrichment of
the other party. If the same painter had completed a mural applied
directly to the wall in the other party's home but received no compensation, we might wish to say that the other party has been enriched, at
at 285-86, 1 N.E. at 312. See text accompanying note 130 supra for the language of the
'
agreement.
249. 3A Corbin, supra note 4, § 646, at 94. See also note 241 supra.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment a.
251. Id. illustration 1, based on Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202
F.2d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1953). However, my reading of Ard suggests that the result rests
on a number of factors and not particularly on the "clear" meaning of the language as
the Comment states. The court neither discusses the language in particular nor contrasts
it with any other phrase. See also REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment
a, illustration 2, based on Devoine Co. v. International Co., 151 Md. 690, 136 A. 37
(1927). The terms "satisfaction" and "complete satisfaction" are definitely not clear
enough in the eyes of the drafters. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228,
Comment a.
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least if the mural has increased the market value of the home. Of
course, we should also consider that the homeowner may not feel himself enriched by a mural with which he is truly dissatisfied adorning his
wall. He may only be waiting until he can afford a new paint job to
cover up the offending work. Worse yet, there may be times when it
will be difficult or impossible to cover up or remove the personally unsatisfactory performance.2112
The consideration of forfeiture is handled in diverse ways. For
most of the early writers, it was explained as a factor to consider in the
interpretation process, representing no new or distinct understanding
about how such contracts should be enforced. It was only a recognition
that the parties themselves would surely have had such a problem in
mind and that our judgment as to their intent should take this into
account.2l1S A comment to the Restatement Second also suggests that
the importance of forfeiture is how it influences the court's determination of the parties' own use of the satisfaction language. "When, as is
often the case, the preferred interpretation will reduce the obligee's
risk of forfeiture, so that § 227(1) applies, there is additional argument
in its favor."2G4 Section 227(1) sets forth, as a general preference, the
interpretation of language that will reduce the obligee's risk of
forfeiture. 21111
One problem with such statements is that the reasoning given appears to run counter to the traditional subject matter distinction, at
least as usually articulated. Things produced to order and valued according to an individual's taste or fancy are the kinds of products
which once rejected are most likely to be valueless in the hands of the
producer. Who would pay much for a portrait of someone else's spouse
or clothing made to suit another's peculiar tastes? The seller is more
likely to suffer a large loss on these items than he would on more
mechanical items or those normally valued by standards of the trade.
For example, if a piece of farm equipment which can be demonstrated
to meet the needs of a reasonable buyer is involved, why not say that
our particular unsatisfied buyer need not accept the equipment? The
dealer can simply find a reasonable farmer to sell it to at a reasonable
price. The seller might lose the higher profit he was expecting to receive from the first contract, but this extra profit presumably was to
come to him because of his unusual promise to leave the buyer satisfied. When he fails and sells to another, he may not come out as well as
252. Consider: Do you think of yourself as "enriched" by a free haircut that turns out
not to your liking?
253. See, e.g., Holmes' language in Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. at 288·89, 21 N.E.
at 313, quoted in text accompanying note 147 supra.
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 228, Comment b.
255. Id. § 227(1).
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he wished, but the result is nothing like a forfeiture. Accordingly, the
possibility of great loss with no offsetting compensation is greater for
the seller in contracts for merchandise appealing to highly personal
taste or fancy. Yet it is in just these cases that all agree the objective
test is not to be applied.
What we can see is that the concern for forfeiture may begin to
explain the rather crazy-quilt pattern of actual cases purporting to apply the subject matter distinction. As noted before, contracts for sale of
goods and employment contracts tended to be classed as those of personal taste and fancy whatever the nature of the goods or the work to
be done':"~8 Perhaps the truth of the matter is that they are so classified, and hence made subject only to the test of honest satisfaction,
because in most cases the courts, by allowing the buyer or employer to
avoid any obligation, is not creating what could be construed as a forfeiture. Most often, the seller still has the goods on hand which usually
can be sold again. The employee has lost only his employment for the
future. But that is no worse than if he had been under the more typical
kind of employment agreement. In fact, those employment contracts
where an objective standard is applied are usually those in which the
employee has already performed substantial work for which he has yet
to be compensated.2II'7 On the other hand, as seen earlier, construction
contracts are almost always accorded the objective standard.2~8 This
did not make much sense when one considered how subject to personal
taste, fancy and even whim, elements of construction can be. It begins
to become clearer, however, when we concentrate on the fact that in
construction contracts the possibility for a so-called forfeiture and unjust enrichment are most prominent/.II~9
256. See notes 207-208 supra.
257. See, e,g., J.K. Seear (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. C.O. Jones & Sons Ins. Agency, 364 S.W.2d
640 (Mo. App. 1963); Breslow v. Gotham Securities, 77 Misc. 2d 721, 354 N.Y.S.2d 550
(Civ. Ct. 1974).
258. See note 212 supra.
259. In viewing a claim of forfeiture or unjust enrichment, we should consider how
the party complaining of unfairness got into the situation in the first place. In Capp
Homes v. Duarte, 617 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1980), the defendants contracted to have a
"shell" of a house built upon a foundation they provided. The contractor's brochure
stated "YOU MUST BE SATISFIED" and Mrs. Duarte testified that she understood
one of the contractor's representatives as personally assuring them that they would not
have to pay for the home (beyond a modest down payment) until they were "100 per
cent" satisfied with it. Id. at 902. The trial resulted in a judgment for the contractor with
what appears to be a substantial set-off for defects in favor of the defendants. While the
court of appeals (in a very unclear and confusing opinion) reversed and ordered a new
trial, it accepted, at one point, the contractor's contention "that easily correctable defects consistent with substantial performance would be insufficient to justify customer
dissatisfaction." Id. This decision, in effect adopting an objective test, does not, according to the court make the "claim of dissatisfaction ••• become meaningless," whatever
that may mean. Id.
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More recent writers, reviewing such cases, have concluded that the
courts' desire to avoid as a matter of policy, what they see as forfeiture
is the real motivation behind the decisions, even if they are expressed
in terms of the neutral objective of interpretation. At the same time,
growing dissatisfaction with such rationalization can be seen. Thus, in
the most recent edition of their treatise, Professors Calamari and Perillo state:
The court's tendency to remake the contract for the parties in
cases involving mechanical fitness, utility or marketability can
be criticized on the ground that under the guise of interpretation the courts ignore the manifest intention of the parties. In
many of the cases such interference with freedom of contract
may be justified on the ground that literal compliance with the
contract would unjustly enrich the person who received the
performance and would be unduly harsh on the person who
rendered the performance. If this is the basis of the decisions,
it is submitted that forthright recognition should be given to
this underlying rationale and a distinction drawn between
cases involving unjust enrichment and forfeiture on the onehand, and cases in which these elements are not present on the
other.26o
The ~uggestion that forthright recognition be given to the nature of the
question the court is being asked to decide is undoubtedly a wise and
welcome one. Unfortunately, the problem cannot really be resolved by
invocation of the terms "forfeiture" and "enrichment" alone. They
serve merely to rephrase the question rather than make it any easier to
answer. Certainly, in recent years there has been a growing sensitivity
to forfeiture. 261 But how are we to judge in a particular situation
At a later point the court seems to put weight on the possible forfeiture aspect of
the contract. It finds "some justification" in the contractor's contention "that a represen·
tation or agreement that a buyer need pay nothing for a house built on his property if he
is dissatisfied with it is not comparable to such an agreement with respect to returnable
personality." ld. at 903. But if the contractor cannot get back part of his work, whose
fault is it? Consider the following from the court's statement of facts:
[A]lthough Capp considered that it had properly completed its undertak·
ing except for a few minor corrections, the Duartes, who during the con·
struction and since have continually claimed dissatisfaction, refused to
pay. Their dissatisfaction reached the point that at one stage of the construction they asked that the work be abandoned and the project taken
back. Their request was rejected.
ld. What could this last sentence possibly mean? In any construction contract, the
builder has no right to continue building nor to run up damages after he has been told to
halt construction.
260. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, § 11-18, at 403.
261. ld. § 11-40, at 454; MURRAY, supra note 7, § 152, at 297, RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
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whether the result when dissatisfaction is claimed is an unwarranted
"forfeiture" or instead a perfectly appropriate and foreseeable outcome
of the contract working itself to one of its several possible natural conclusions? The term "forfeiture" is often used too loosely to encompass
all cases where one party has put a good deal of time and effort into an
agreement and stands to receive nothing in return. But it should more
accurately be limited to only those instances where the risk of this
happening cannot fairly be said, by whatever measure we choose to
judge such things, to have been placed upon the producer. Once a
. party has agreed to be paid only if he satisfies another, it is difficult to
argue that he has not taken upon himself the risk that after much effort he may come up empty-handed. This seems easy to recognize in
many instances. An example is the unknown painter, who is able to
secure a commission only by making such a deal. The artist has taken
a great risk, but it can be appreciated why he would do so. That it is
difficult to extend this notion to other situations may only be a measure of our narrow minds and the narrow range of our experience.slIs
Granted, a supplier of farm machinery may not be expected to take
such a risk. But then it would not be expected of him, in the normal
course of things, to agree to receive payment only if he satisified either.
The Calamari and Perillo suggestion to focus directly on the question of which risks are properly placed on each party is a reminder that
we are living in a world of particular people and particular bargains,
not of classes of contracts of abstract and meaningless description. But
it does not really assist in deciding any individual case. What seems
like forfeiture when viewed from one party's point of view can seem
like simple justice from the other's. There is a similar problem with the
notion of "enrichment" in such a context. Normally, enrichment is
thought of as being present when one party has received something of
value, meaning that the average man in the street would be willing to
pay for it. But in this instance the party who has received something
supra note 4, § 229.

262. The concern about a too casual use of the term "forfeiture" in this situation is
not new. Judge Learned Hand addressed the problem in Thompson-Starrett Co. v. La
Belle Iron Works, 17 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1927), stating:
That the case is a hard one goes without saying. The plaintiff is defeated in
a large recovery by what was apparently the obstinacy and prejudice of the company's superintendant-we speak from the opinion. But it is a misnomer to call
this a forfeiture, as the brief repeats on almost every page. The promisee of a
conditional promise always runs the chance of losing what he has done, if he
fails to fulfill the condition, and when he puts his labor on the promisor's land,
the promisor will be the gainer. There is no injustice in that, if he has agreed to
bring to pass the condition. It is quite true that we must not read such contracts
narrowly, for they are severe; but, once understood, it is as prime a consideration
as in any other case that the parties should be confined to their bargain.
Id. at 543.
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can argue with some force that he specifically took himself out of the
average run of affairs and is not to be judged by them. The notion of
enrichment, like that of forfeiture, seems to stand on a base of ordinary "reasonable" expectations and bargains. Once outside that particular realm, it is difficult to see how such terms can offer in themselves
a solution to the problems presented.
Professor Murray's treatise contains virtually no reference to the
traditional doctrine in the area, and instead quickly launches into his
own analysis, stating:
For many years the abhorrence of forfeitures could be seen in
the results if not the rationales of many courts dealing with
conditions of personal satisfaction. . . . Courts may feel compelled to circumvent the literal application of a personal satisfaction provision because of tension between freedom of contract and the traditional abhorrence of forfeiture. If the
personal taste -mechanical fitness distinction is not used,
some courts will simply substitute a reasonableness test while
others may even resort to that ultimate ambiguity which is
used to cover a multitude of analytical failures: "waiver." In
this fashion, the impasse of the clear language of condition of
personal satisfaction which cannot be directly attacked (since
the judgment of the obligor has been apparently exercised honestly, albeit unreasonably) is avoided. 268
He proceeds to offer a hypothetical similar in many respects to one
suggested at the beginning of this article of a housepainter who has
contracted to paint a house to the satisfaction of the owner.2M We
questioned what should be the result if the homeowner were truly dissatisfied, because of an especially fine eye for color or a particularly
fussy nature, with work with which most everyone else would be'satisfied. 26G Murray's example is of a retired carpenter who inserts a clear
condition of personal satisfaction into a contract for the construction
of a house in which he will reside. 266 The house is built to existing
standards of carpentry workmanship, but is not pleasing to the carpenter, who sees it as "sloppy" to his trained eye. Murray continues:
Should the obligor receive the benefit without payment? There
is no reason to suspect the obligor's honest dissatisfaction
though it is established he is unreasonable in his judgment, at
263. MURRAY, supra note 7, § 152, at 297-98. He concludes his section on the subject
by saying, "it would be helpful if courts would confront the problem and attempt to
analyze it rather than paying lip service to the literal rule only to abandon it through the
use of covert tools," Id. at 300.
264. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
265. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
266. MURRAY, supra note 7, § 152, at 298-99.
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least according to current generally accepted standards of reasonable carpentry. Yet, the builder knew he was constructing a
house for a retired carpenter who, himself, had performed carpentry in many similar buildings. The builder also knew that
he was assuming the risk that the building would meet the personal satisfaction of the obligor - not simply any obligor but an obligor with a trained eye for carpentry. To suggest that
the builder may recover the contract price, i.e., that the condition of personal satisfaction will be excused, is to judicially
subtract that risk from the contract which the parties clearly
formed. There seems little warrant for doing this kind of violence to the already circumscribed concept of "freedom of
contract. "267
He suggests an analysis based on what he refers to as the materiality of
the condition "under the circumstances" but which really focuses on
the materiality of the failure of the condition.268 Is this to be judged
from the point of view of the person to be satisfied, the other (performing) party, or some hypothetical third party stance? Murray concludes,
by analogy to a section of the Uniform Commercial Code':~69 that the
question should be addressed from the subjective position of the conditional obligor. "[T]he test might be: Is the value of the performance
substantially impaired to the obligor? If the answer is yes, the performance is materially deficient 'to him' and may be rejected notwith267. [d.
268. The two concepts are not identical. The question of materiality of a condition is
one which could be answered at the time of contracting, while the materiality of the
extent to which a condition has not been met becomes a matter of concern only after the
fact. So, for instance, the classic case of a material condition is that of the payment of
premiums on an insurance contract conditioning the insurance company's liability. But if
the premiums due had been $500 and only $499 had been paid, we might want to say
that while the condition was and always had been material, the failure of the condition
in this instance was not. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 230 N.Y. 230
(1921).
As Murray correctly points out, not all conditions of personal satisfaction are mate- .
rial. MURRAY, supra note 7, § 152, at 299. For example, if a contract called for a portrait
to be painted "satisfactory to the buyer" and also called for "satisfactory notice" of the
painting's completion, satisfactory completion of the work would be a material condition
to the buyer's obligation to pay for it. His own satisfaction about the notice of its completion, however, might not be material. If a condition of personal satisfaction is clearly
not material, then it could more easily be excused for one reason or another, possibly
even for what the Restatement Second calls "extreme forfeiture." REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 229. But in most of the cases discussed, the condition is clearly
material, and the question should then become in Murray's mind whether the failure of
such a condition should be called material in the particular instance.
269. The analogy he draws is to that section of the Code dealing with the right of a
buyer of goods to revoke an acceptance. U.C.C. § 2-608.
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standing forfeiture to the obligee."27o The meaning of this test is unclear. What does it mean to assert that a performance is "substantially
impaired" as to a particular individual? Is this impairment to be measured on some financial "value" basis? If so, perhaps all Murray'S test
does is emphasize that the judgment is to be that of a reasonable person "in the obligor's position." This is only the objective test most fully
expressed. Or may it be said that the worth of a performance is "substantially impaired" for a person when he expected it to be something
which he would like and which he does not? This is certainly a fair
statement, but if so, this rule reduces itself to nothing more than the
subjective test.
Especially if given the latter reading, Professor Murray's suggestion may also be questioned for being, at least as articulated, too solici. tous of the conditional obligor's position. It focuses exclusively on what
is in his mind and does not consider what the other party does know,
could know, or should know about what is expected of him. Earlier, I
criticized the Restatement Second for appearing to show too great a
concern for the needs of the nonjudging party to be fully informed and
acquiescent to the situation.271 Murray's rule simply stated seems to go
too far in the other direction. Implicitly, I believe, he realizes this, In
his discussion of the house built for the very meticulous carpenter
given above, he emphasizes the fact that the builder knew he was performing for a retired carpenter with a "trained eye" for such work.271,
VII.

CONCLUSION

Setting the question in terms of forfeiture, enrichment or materiality is ultimately unsuccessful because such concepts gain their usefulness by drawing on our beliefs about what typical people would want
or expect in typical situations. When applying these doctrines we are
always careful, at least in theory, to enunciate their results as subject
to revision if it can be shown that the particular parties before the
court had themselves entered into a different agreement. Such doctrines operate, in the words of Cardozo, in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent, "in the silence of the parties."278 In the situations we have been
discussing the parties have not been silent, although they may have
been cryptic. The traditional rules, as exemplified by the Restatement
Second section, acknowledge that the individualized bargain of the
parties is the matter of concern. But these rules prove troublesome because they act on the fundamental assumption which underlies all we
do in the name of interpretation - that the parties did have at the
270. MURRAY, supra note 7, § 152, at 299.
271. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
272. See quotation at note 267 supra.
273. 230 N.Y. 239, 243, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
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time of contracting a single common understanding of the meaning to
be given to the contested term. The problem presumed by traditional
rules is to establish what that common understanding was.
It is submitted that a more realistic and helpful assumption would
be that each party, himself, had some understanding of what the term
was meant to accomplish but that their understandings did not necessarily coincide. The question then becomes an example of the general
problem which must be confronted when there is an actual or claimed
misunderstanding of the parties as to the meaning of a material term
of the contract.274 If a misunderstanding is shown to have existed at
the time of contracting, is there a good reason to hold one of the parties bound to a contract as understood by the other? The reasons
which the law allows as being "good" in this situation center around
the actual knowledge each party had at the time and that information
which he had a "reason to knoW."275
I would begin with the proposition that both parties know or have
reason to know that the conditional promisor may believe that his personal dissatisfaction, honestly arrived at, will relieve him of his duty to
perform. The basis for this position is simply the literal reading of the
clause with nothing more. Thus, the honesty test alone would be that
generally used unless the other, performing party could establish that a
different test should be applied. He could do this by proving (1) that at
the time of contracting he actually had a different belief, that is, he
thought some test other than actual satisfaction was to be used to determine whether the condition had been fulfilled, and (2) that the conditional promisor knew or had reason to' know at the time of contracting that this was the other's belief. This rule might result in a
decrease in the number of instances in which the objective test is relied
upon, but this should not be troubling to us. For one thing, I believe
that the subjective test has a greater practical effect (more "teeth" if
you will) than might initially be imagined. Beyond this, if in any instance we are not allowing the one party to hold the other judging
party to a duty to make a "reasonable determination," it is for a justifiable reason. Either he cannot convince us that at the time of contracting he had in his own mind some test other than honesty, in which
case his insistence on an objective test now is an attempt to change the
contract after the fact, or he has not been able to demonstrate that the
other party knew or had reason to know the different criteria he had in
mind. To the extent that this party is now trying to impose upon the
other a meaning of the clause at odds with the literal meanmz, should
274. See RESTATMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, §§ 20, 201. If the condition of personal
satisfaction is not a material term, of course, then it may appropriately be dealt with
differently or excused. See note 268 supra.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 20, Comment b.
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he not take the burden of establishing this deviant meaning as that
which was understood, or should reasonably have been understood, by
the other party at the time of bargaining? In effect the rule serves to
protect the expectations, provided they are reasonable, of the party
who has entered into an agreement under which his "satisfaction" was
to determine his obligations.
Note that this proposed rule, in placing upon the nonjudging party
the burden of establishing agreement to "some test other than actual
satisfaction," acknowledges that this party may wish to, and be able to,
establish some standard or measure of fulfillment which is neither the
subjective test nor the objective test but something distinct from them
both. In our earlier hypothetical about the housepainter agreeing to
paint the exterior of a house to the homeowner's satisfaction,S78 the
painter may be able to establish that the clause should have been understood by both parties to require the owner's honest satisfaction with
the quality of workmanship and not the exact color the house was
painted. A different test would be workmanship to the general standard of performance normally applicable to interior workmanship, presumably to be a finer quality than and not generally that sought for
exteriors. Still different would be a quality of painting "as good as can
be done." Any of these possibililies would create its own problems of
proof, but the party who is arguing this to have been his understanding
of the applicable criterion, and trying to hold the other party to that
criterion, would presumably have been aware of this risk at the time he
undertook the job. If nothing else, we would expect that the risk was
taken into account when the price was set.
What would be "reason to know" in such a case? It would take
into account anything of relevance, especially any preliminary communications between the parties.:m In particular, we could consider
whether one party had reason to know that the other meant something
beyond the literal meaning of the words by virtue of the potential risk
he could have foreseen the other might be undertaking of not being
paid a penny for a substantial amount of work. Could he reasonably
believe the performing party meant to take such a risk? For example.
in a construction contract the person for whom the building was being
done (to specification and to satisfaction) might have reason to know
that the contractor was not willing to risk all on the basis of that one
276. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
277. I have suggested that the traditionally applied rules do not give sufficient attention to this factual background, if for no other reason than the great part played by the
subject matter distinction. The more recent proposals concentrating on questions of forfeiture, enrichment or materiality of breach, at least in theory look to the results of the
contract relationship after the fact and not at the time of contracting. That such discussions often end up referring to what the parties knew or discussed at the earlier date
demonstrates to me the difficulty with using these concepts to analyze the problem.
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short satisfaction clause. But then what was the clause to mean? Here
is where I find it best to put the burden on the contractor to come
forward with exactly what he believed the parties agreed to by its inclusion. If it was not the test of honesty and good faith dealing alone,
then what was it? And on what basis can he hold the other party to
this meaning? In particular, if he claims the clause is to be- read as
requiring only an objective test similar to the traditional measure of
substantial performance, thus effectively robbing the clause of any significant effect, he should be able to show that the purchasing party
knew or had reason to know that this was what he was signing.
The proposed rule is also particularly effective in that it implicitly
takes into account by whom and how the satisfaction clause was introduced into the contract relationship. If a purchasing party first suggests the clause, for example, by agreeing to take an item "only if I'm
satisfied with it," it may be quite possible for the seller to establish
that by agreeing to this further condition he only meant to warrant
that the item would meet the particular standards or expectations the
purchaser had outlined during the course of negotiations as being of
special concern to him, and furthermore that the purchaser should
have been aware of this as the seller's understanding. At the same
time, the proposed analysis provides maximum protection to the average consumer lured into a purchase by a general proclamation of "Satisfaction Guaranteed."
The reasonable person first made his way into the law of contract
as the clumsy metaphor for a fundamental principle of how it would
deal with problems inherent in communication.us He stands for the
proposition not that each of us is to look out for his fellows as a part of
the bargaining process, but that we must, in bargaining, take the risks
of our own "unreasonable" use of language, signs and gestures, "unreasonable" meaning a use of such signs which is far from the community
norm. We do so not because of concern for others, but in recognition of
the fact that our chance of gain by entering into the marketplace carries with it attendant responsibilities. But these are responsibilities to
ourselves; if we fail to make our own special wants or needs - our
idiosyncracies - clear, we suffer the consequences. It is well to remember this. The law has no way of knowing what would, could or should
satisfy the reasonable person. It has no business deciding what "ought
to satisfy" anybody. It is quite another thing for the law to say that
each of us "ought to" make clear what we expect out of the bargaining
process and take the consequences of the failure to do so. It is this and
nothing more that the proposed rule seeks to accomplish.

278. See note 28 supra.

